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I. INTRODUCTION
“In undertaking the privilege to practice law, I do solemnly swear that I will
lie, deceive, misrepresent, and engage in fraud in order to serve my client’s
and my own personal interests.”
Although I doubt that anyone reading this Article has sworn such
an oath (or openly advocates the use of such an oath for newly sworn
attorneys), the issue of whether attorneys may ethically engage in de-
ception has not enjoyed the thorough, open discussion necessary for a
consistently applied standard.  This must change.  Nearly a century
ago, Louis D. Brandeis wrote that publicity can remedy social dis-
eases, because sunlight is the best disinfectant and can effectively po-
lice human behavior.1  A half-century before that, Lord Acton stated,
“Every thing secret degenerates, even the administration of justice.”2
The legal profession, as guardian of the administration of justice,
needs some disinfecting sunlight to pour over the attorney deception
issue, one that for too long has vexed and perplexed attorneys and
judges.  As a profession, attorneys need a full and open debate to de-
termine whether, and to what extent, it is ethical for attorneys to em-
ploy deception.
This Article concludes that the American Bar Association (ABA)
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) currently do not
contain a deception exception, and that without such an exception, at-
torneys employing deceptive practices are subject to charges of unethi-
cal misconduct.  There are circumstances, however, that reveal how
society can benefit through the use of deception.  For example, long-
standing policies of federal and state governments employ deception
in undercover criminal investigations, various civil-rights groups em-
ploy deception to root out and eradicate discrimination, and holders of
1. See LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(1914).
2. United States v. Salemme, 91 F. Supp. 2d 141, 148 (D. Mass. 1999) (quoting JOHN
EMERICH EDWARD DALBERG ACTON, LORD ACTON AND HIS CIRCLE 166 (Abbot Gas-
quet ed., Burt Franklin 1968) (1906)).
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intellectual property rights employ deception to ensure that others do
not unlawfully infringe upon those rights.  Although arguably a cer-
tain amount of deception is required to support these investigative ef-
forts (because those suspected of unlawful activity are unlikely to
continue their lawlessness if an investigator reveals his true purpose),
there is no sound public policy that requires attorneys to personally
engage in the deception.  That does not mean, however, that, in the
absence of positive law to the contrary, non-attorneys should be pro-
hibited by attorney ethics rules from employing deception simply be-
cause an attorney directs the deception.  This Article promotes a well-
defined investigation exception to the prohibition of attorney decep-
tion, or what I term “the investigative deception exception.”
Part II of this Article describes a recent news-making case involv-
ing attorney deception to set the stage for a discussion of whether at-
torneys may ethically engage in deception.  Part III creates an
analytical framework using the Model Rules to guide the discussion of
disciplinary cases involving attorney deception.  In Part IV this Article
analyzes key disciplinary cases and ethics opinions implicating attor-
ney deception.  This Article then illustrates in Part V how some states
have enacted express deception exceptions to their ethics rules.  Fi-
nally, in Part VI this Article proposes an express investigation decep-
tion exception to the Model Rules.  As the legal profession determines
the scope of the deception exception, however, attorneys must stri-
dently ensure that any unintended byproducts do not include the crea-
tion of distrust in the legal profession or the system of justice.
Regardless of whether you ultimately agree with this Article’s pro-
posed investigation deception exception, attorneys owe each other, the
legal profession, the administration of justice, and the citizens that
rely on our efforts, a full and open debate on the ethics of attorney
deception.  Let’s get to it.
II. AN ATTORNEY DID WHAT?  USING ATTORNEY
DECEPTION TO CATCH A CRIMINAL
Attorney deception can take—and has taken—many forms, includ-
ing lying to non-clients, clients, and even courts.  For obvious reasons,
attorneys who engage in deception seek to be cloaked in anonymity to
reap the benefits of their deception; being fair and forthright may not
yield the same benefits as being cloaked in anonymity.  As such, attor-
neys who engage in deception—or instruct others to engage in decep-
tion—often claim that deception is required to meet the needs of
justice.  This yields a couple of straight-forward questions.  Are there
circumstances in which attorneys may ethically engage in deception?
If those circumstances exist, and if there should be a deception excep-
tion, what should be its scope?  To fairly answer these questions, we
must ask whether the legal profession, under the policing and cleans-
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ing glare of sunlight through open debate, can rationalize that the
ends sought to be achieved justify the means of attorney deception.
Although this Article will discuss numerous situations in which at-
torneys have used deception, it might be prudent to begin by describ-
ing the publicly available facts of an interesting—yet controversial—
case in which a Nebraska attorney recently made headlines by partici-
pating in an undercover investigation to catch a criminal.  Assisting
both federal and state authorities, apparently under the direction and
supervision of government attorneys, a criminal-defense attorney
chose to wear a wire to record jailhouse conversations with a suspect.3
From the public record, it is difficult to determine whether the attor-
ney was acting as though he was the suspect’s attorney, was being
paid by the suspect to represent a co-defendant, or simply was acting
as a criminal co-conspirator in a non-representational, non-attorney
capacity.  Regardless of the actual role assumed by the attorney, it is
undisputed that the attorney intentionally employed deception to help
authorities gather evidence against the suspect.  The attorney un-
doubtedly hid his true identity and purpose as an undercover govern-
ment informant from the suspect—otherwise the suspect may not
have provided any damaging information.4  Given the facts outlined
below, the legal profession must ask whether attorneys have the uni-
lateral right to decide to engage in this type of deception without run-
ning afoul of ethical standards.  Society is listening for the answer.
A. Fact Pattern of the Recent Nebraska Case of Attorney
Deception
By most publicly available accounts, Shannon Williams seems to
be regarded as a dangerous man and a criminal.  Williams has been
charged with committing serious crimes, such as murdering a rival
gang member (of which he was acquitted), distributing crack cocaine,
and possessing marijuana.5  More recently, federal authorities began
to suspect that Williams was the mastermind and architect of a multi-
million-dollar marijuana ring that trafficked more than a ton of mari-
juana between Phoenix, Arizona, and Omaha, Nebraska.6
The investigation into Williams’s marijuana trafficking activities
began with an October 5, 2008, traffic stop in Illinois of a speeding
3. Todd Cooper, Lawyer Goes into Hiding, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 10, 2010, at
01A, available at http://www.omaha.com/article/20100110/NEWS01/701109912
[hereinafter Cooper, Lawyer Goes into Hiding].
4. Cooper, Lawyer Goes into Hiding, supra note 3.
5. Id.; Todd Cooper, Convict Ran Pot Ring from Jail, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Dec.
19, 2009, at 01A, available at http://www.omaha.com/article/20091219/NEWS01/
712199834/0/frontpage [hereinafter Cooper, Pot Ring].
6. Cooper, Pot Ring, supra note 5.
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truck carrying 329 pounds of marijuana.7  After the stop, the driver of
the truck, Steve Kisseberth, and passenger, Richard Conway, agreed
to cooperate with authorities.8  They allowed the authorities to follow
the truck to Omaha.9  Later that day in Omaha, authorities arrested a
woman who appeared to be acting as a lookout for the truck carrying
the marijuana.10  That woman was 23-year-old Nyasha Muchegwa, an
immigrant from Zimbabwe who advertised herself on the internet as
an “escort.”11  Marijuana conspiracy charges were filed against Kis-
seberth, Conway, and Muchegwa.12 Through Kisseberth’s and Con-
way’s cooperation, investigators learned that these men, as part of a
larger group directed by Williams, had been running 300 to 400
pounds of marijuana between Phoenix and Omaha for over a year.13
After obtaining this information, the authorities launched a multis-
tate investigation into the large-scale marijuana operation.14
At some point, investigators learned that Williams paid $8,000 to
Terry L. Haddock, an Omaha attorney, to represent Conway in the
matter.15  Haddock, though, grew concerned about Williams’s violent
criminal activity.  For example, Haddock told people that during his
initial discussions with Williams about defending Conway on the ma-
rijuana charges, Williams talked about “eliminating” witnesses.16  Al-
though the status of the relationship between Haddock, Williams, and
Conway is not entirely clear, Haddock was linked to them in some
capacity.  Haddock was also linked to Muchegwa.  Before her October
5 arrest on marijuana conspiracy charges, Haddock had acted as
Muchegwa’s defense attorney on various criminal charges.17  To make
matters more complicated, Muchegwa testified during a deposition,
which was taken in connection with a crime that she witnessed, that
her relationship with Haddock was personal, perhaps romantic, before
Haddock agreed to act as her attorney.18  On October 6, 2008, a day
after the traffic stop of the truck hauling marijuana and Muchegwa’s
arrest, Haddock began representing Muchegwa on the marijuana
7. Cooper, Lawyer Goes into Hiding, supra note 3.
8. Todd Cooper, Suspected Drug Lord Duped, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 3, 2010,
at 01A, available at http://www.omaha.com/article/20100103/NEWS01/7010399
03 [hereinafter Cooper, Drug Lord Duped].
9. Cooper, Lawyer Goes into Hiding, supra note 3.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Cooper, Drug Lord Duped, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Cooper, Lawyer Goes into Hiding, supra note 3.
17. Id.
18. Id.
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charges.19  Federal prosecutors dismissed the marijuana charges
against Muchegwa two weeks later.20
In January 2009, Williams was arrested for indecent exposure in
Peoria, Arizona.21  The arrest resulted in a search of Williams’s house,
during which 297 pounds of marijuana was recovered.22  Williams
then provided a false name to the police, posted an $800 bond, and fled
the state.23 Williams was not free for long.  Police Officer John Stuck
of the Bellevue (Nebraska) Police Department later arrested Williams
in Minnesota for violating his supervised release from a 1993 crack-
dealing conviction in Douglas County, Nebraska.24  Officer Stuck ob-
tained Williams’s cellular telephone number from Haddock, and
traced the number to Minnesota.25  Williams was eventually delivered
to the custody of the Douglas County Correctional Center.26
Although Williams was now in custody at the Correctional Center
in Nebraska, authorities investigating the marijuana ring wanted
more information about Williams’s activities, his co-conspirators, and
the extent of the drug operation.  In the summer of 2009, Officer Stuck
asked Haddock if he would act as a secret government informant by
meeting with Williams at the Correctional Center while secretly tape-
recording the conversations.27  As an attorney, Haddock was allowed
to meet face-to-face with Williams without jailers being allowed to lis-
ten to the conversations, an arrangement which might lead Williams
to reveal incriminating information.28  Haddock agreed to act as an
undercover government informant and tape his conversations with
Williams.29
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Cooper, Pot Ring, supra note 5.
22. Cooper, Drug Lord Duped, supra note 8.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.  Generally, only attorneys and members of the clergy are allowed to meet face-
to-face with inmates at the Correctional Center.  Jason Kuiper, Jail Security Pro-
cedures May Change, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 19, 2010, at 02B, available at
http://www.omaha.com/article/20100119/NEWS01/701199930.  To meet with an
inmate, attorneys are required to show a valid bar membership card and leave
their belongings in a locker. Id.
29. Cooper, Drug Lord Duped, supra note 8.  Interestingly, the local Omaha newspa-
per reported that the United States Attorney for Nebraska “declined to explain
authorities’ decision to use an attorney to glean information from [the] alleged
marijuana kingpin.”  Todd Cooper, Crime Plotting May Be Beyond Scope of Policy,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 3, 2010, at 01A, available at http://www.omaha.
com/article/20100103/NEWS01/ 701039913/0/frontpage.
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While secretly recording the jailhouse discussions, Haddock met
with Williams more than thirty times over a six-month period.30  Wil-
liams apparently trusted Haddock and spoke freely with him, result-
ing in authorities obtaining a wealth of information about Williams’s
ongoing criminal activities.  During their face-to-face meetings, Had-
dock even provided Williams with a cellular telephone, which Wil-
liams allegedly used to run the multimillion-dollar marijuana ring
from inside the Correctional Center.31  Williams also asked Haddock
to launder money and to pay someone to beat up Williams’s longtime
defense attorney.32  Each time Williams requested Haddock to act,
Haddock promised to comply with Williams’s orders.33  Although Had-
dock only pretended to comply with Williams’s orders and did not fol-
low through with them, Williams believed that Haddock was doing
what Williams requested.34  As a result of the investigation, and ow-
ing in large part to the information gained from Haddock’s deception,
the federal government indicted Williams and ten others on mari-
juana and money-laundering charges in December 2009.35
The existence of an attorney–client relationship between Williams
and Haddock is likely to be a central issue in this case.  Officer Stuck
has since testified that in the first meeting between Haddock and Wil-
liams, Haddock “explained that he [was] not [Williams’s] attorney and
would not do any legal work for him at all.”36  Haddock claims that he
agreed to wear the wire to record conversations with Williams because
Williams threatened federal witnesses.37  Williams, on the other
hand, has stated that he had hired Haddock as his attorney to help
with a lawsuit over the sentencing disparities for dealing powdered
cocaine versus crack cocaine.38  In response to a government motion to
seal information related to the deal that secured Haddock’s coopera-
tion, Williams’s defense attorney issued the following statement:
We believe the government has engaged in outrageous misconduct here.
The best way, the only way, [to respond to the motion to seal information re-
lated to the deal] is to require the government to put all their cards on the
30. Cooper, Drug Lord Duped, supra note 8.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id.
35. Kuiper, supra note 28; Todd Cooper, Williams Wants Charges Dropped, OMAHA
WORLD-HERALD, Jan. 5, 2010, at 01B, available at http://www.omaha.com/article/
20100105/NEWS01/100109898/0/LIVING01 [hereinafter Cooper, Wants Charges
Dropped].
36. Cooper, Drug Lord Duped, supra note 8.
37. Todd Cooper, Attorney’s Wire Motive Challenged, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May
24, 2010, at 01A, available at http://www.omaha.com/article/20100524/NEWS97/
100529815 [hereinafter Cooper, Wire Motive Challenged].
38. Cooper, Drug Lord Duped, supra note 8; see Cooper, Wire Motive Challenged,
supra note 37; Cooper, Wants Charges Dropped, supra note 35.
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table—to expose to the public all of the goings on so the court can properly
judge it.39
B. Are Attorneys Ethically Permitted to Engage in
Deception?
What do you think?  After reading the fact pattern (assuming pub-
lic reports are accurate), do you have a firm understanding of whether
Haddock—or the government attorneys directing him—engaged in
ethical deception as part of the federal and state investigations of Wil-
liams’s suspected criminal activities?  What analytical framework did
you apply to these facts to reach a reasoned legal conclusion?  Even if
you are unable to coherently apply an analytical framework and set of
legal standards to these facts, do you have a guttural instinct on
whether Haddock acted ethically as an attorney by employing decep-
tion to help bring down Williams?  Do you believe that there would be
consensus among the bench and bar on whether Haddock engaged in
ethical behavior?40
39. Cooper, Wire Motive Challenged, supra note 37.  The Haddock case is not the first
time that law enforcement officials have used an attorney to employ deception
within the apparent attorney–client relationship to gather information against
the client.  In Ohio, law enforcement officials discovered that an attorney named
Francis Pignatelli had been assisting his drug-dealing clients in laundering drug
money and convinced him to serve as an undercover government informant
against his clients.  Phil Trexler, Leniency Is Rejected for Lawyer: Summit Sher-
iff, Agents Speak on His Behalf, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 19, 2009, at B1, available
at 2009 WLNR 25717084.  Through his undercover informant work, Pignatelli
delivered “more than $3 million in cash and pounds of drugs” while “sealing the
convictions of the area’s most notorious drug dealers,” who were Pignatelli’s cli-
ents. Id.  Pignatelli voluntarily surrendered his license to practice law in Ohio.
Id.; see Phil Trexler, Attorney Enters Guilty Plea: Federal Informant Will Be Sen-
tenced on Single Conspiracy Drug Charge, AKRON BEACON J., Sept. 26, 2009, at
B1, available at 2009 WLNR 19166570; see also People v. Pignatelli, No.
09PDJ007, 2009 WL 4018513 (Colo. Nov. 13, 2009) (disbarring Pignatelli from
the practice of law for lying on his bar application about the criminal proceedings
in Ohio).
40. As an anecdotal story, I talked with various attorneys and law professors about
the Haddock case as I contemplated writing this Article.  One could say that I
conducted a rudimentary, unscientific poll of intelligent and experienced attor-
neys to get a sense of how attorneys might respond to the issue of attorney decep-
tion.  The results of that poll suggest that there is not a quick and apparent
answer to whether attorneys may ethically engage in deception.  One prominent
attorney thunderously responded that it was “obvious” that Haddock was ethi-
cally permitted to act as a covert government informant to help gain critical infor-
mation about the dangerous Williams.  This response fell along the lines of the
ends-justify-the-means rationale.  Two nights later, another prominent attorney
vociferously exclaimed that it was “obvious” that Haddock had violated numerous
ethical duties that are “fundamental and basic” to the practice of law.  This re-
sponse pointed to an ideological belief that attorneys should not be—or be per-
ceived to be—liars.  A couple of attorneys cautiously conceded that although they
did not really know whether Haddock had violated any ethics rules, they admit-
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The issue of attorney deception should be exposed to the light of
day and enjoy a vigorous and open debate so that all attorneys know
the bounds of ethical behavior.  As will be described below, the out-
comes of various attorney misconduct cases demonstrate a lack of con-
sensus on whether and when attorneys may ethically engage in
deception.  This appears true even in cases where the ends seem to
justify the means—when the lesser of two evils seems to justify the
use of attorney deception.41  But case-by-case determinations on the
permissibility of attorney deception threaten to slide along a slippery
slope, leading to public mistrust of attorneys, attorney confusion re-
garding ethical expectations, and, ultimately, either unenforceable or
under-enforced ethical standards.  Indeed, if each attorney is free to
unilaterally carve out exceptions to deception prohibitions, then ethics
rules cease to function as rules; they become mere guidelines.  To safe-
guard the integrity of the legal profession and protect attorneys, there
must be sound, clear, enforceable ethical standards that effectively
govern the conduct of attorneys who may ponder employing deception.
I propose an express, but limited, investigation deception exception
that would make it ethical for attorneys to direct investigators who
lawfully use deception to root out suspected unconstitutional or un-
lawful activity.
III. INTRODUCTION TO THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: A
STROLL THROUGH THE MODEL RULES
It is important to create an analytical framework that will guide
the analysis of whether attorneys may ethically engage in deception,
no matter how one chooses to interpret or apply the ethical standards
within that framework.  The most logical approach is to focus on the
Model Rules.  Although some states’ regulatory schemes vary some-
what from the Model Rules, those variations usually do not implicate
the basic analytical framework that governs the issue of attorney de-
ception.42  Because a few states have attempted to explicitly regulate
attorney deception, those variations will be discussed in due course in
Part V.
When addressing attorney deception, it should be openly stipu-
lated that attorneys do not simply serve their own desires or even the
ted that Haddock’s conduct “did not smell right.”  Finally, one attorney wondered
aloud whether this type of attorney deception would force criminal defendants to
be cautious when hiring or sharing information with an attorney.
41. The fault in an implied ends-justify-the-means exception lies in the inherent diffi-
culty of accurately determining in any given situation what ends and what means
are at stake, such that logic can then dictate if an attorney may ethically employ
deception under the circumstances.
42. To remain consistent throughout the Article, I refer to the Model Rules and not to
each state’s specific designation for their particular ethics rules.
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desires of a single client.  Although attorneys obviously represent cli-
ents, attorneys also serve as officers of the court to protect our legal
system by standing as bulwarks of justice.43  Attorneys must remain
vigilant in conducting themselves to ensure that the public trusts our
justice system and the rule of law.44  Because “legal institutions in a
constitutional democracy depend on popular participation and support
to maintain their authority” and trustworthiness, attorneys must
work to improve the public’s perception of the legal profession.45  One
unique and empowering way of accomplishing this laudable goal is to
actively self-regulate attorney conduct to better serve the public inter-
est.  As a general rule, attorneys must act ethically at all times.  Nev-
ertheless, the goal of requiring attorneys to act ethically is only a
starting point and not an ultimate proclamation—what is obviously
ethical to one person may be obviously unethical to another.
By self-regulating conduct within the legal profession, attorneys
stand in a unique position in society by ensuring the fair operation of
an entire branch of government, the judicial system.46  Accordingly,
when deciding the contours of what conduct is ethical, attorneys must
look outside “of parochial or self-interested concerns” to ensure that
their conduct steadfastly serves the public interest.47  Each attorney
must act as his or her own compliance officer by voluntarily complying
with the letter and spirit of ethics rules, ensuring that other attorneys
comply with their ethical obligations, and rigorously enforcing the
rules through formal disciplinary systems.48  In the final analysis,
however, ethics rules should strive to provide a practical and workable
analytical framework that will safeguard the ethical practice of law.49
Whenever difficult ethical issues arise, such as attorney deception, at-
torneys must seek to apply ethics rules to serve the purposes behind
the rules, which requires a balancing of duties to clients, the system of
justice, participants in that system, and democratic society itself.50
To support a self-regulating system there must be clear ethical
standards that can be effectively enforced.  Once these standards have
been adopted, members of the legal profession undoubtedly must “ad-
here to the highest moral and ethical standards,” which must “apply
regardless of motive.”51  As attorneys carry out their fundamental du-
ties in our society—from assisting people in understanding their legal
rights and obligations to helping resolve legal conflicts—they should
43. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 1 (2007).
44. See id. ¶ 6.
45. Id.
46. See id. ¶ 10.
47. Id. ¶ 12.
48. See id. ¶¶ 12, 16.
49. Id. ¶ 16.
50. See id. ¶ 9.
51. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175, 1176 (Colo. 2002) (en banc).
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be steadfastly committed to engendering public faith, trust, and confi-
dence in the idea that attorneys conduct themselves diligently, compe-
tently, loyally, fairly, and honestly.52
After that brief introduction on the purposes behind legal ethics,
there really is no way to comfortably transition to the Model Rules
that govern attorney deception other than to simply get to it.  As has
been stated, “If you have to eat two frogs, eat the big one first.”  Thus,
I will take a sequential stroll through the Model Rules to create the
analytical framework that will determine whether attorney deception
is ethical.  Although this approach might not be ideal, it is important
to first digest the framework and standards before discussing cases
involving attorney deception that will challenge those standards.  This
introduction to the relevant Model Rules, therefore, will serve as a
guide for the rest of this Article.
Part 1 of the Model Rules governs the ethical rules relating to the
attorney–client relationship.  Rule 1.2(d) prohibits an attorney from
counseling or assisting a client to engage in criminal or fraudulent
conduct.53  If a client wishes to use the attorney’s services to commit a
crime or fraud, the attorney cannot simply continue to represent the
client.  Instead, the attorney must counsel the client to act lawfully, or
the attorney must withdraw from the attorney–client relationship.54
Attorneys serve society by helping to uphold the law, not by helping to
violate it.
Rule 1.6 details the ethical contours of an attorney’s duty of confi-
dentiality, an all-important duty that builds trust, a hallmark of the
attorney–client relationship.55  Rule 1.6 informs our discussion of at-
torney deception in two ways.  First, the dishonest use of the appear-
ance of an attorney–client relationship to deceive the client into
disclosing confidential information erodes the foundation of trust built
upon society’s understanding of an attorney’s ethical duty of confiden-
tiality.  The legal profession must carefully protect this foundation.
Second, Rule 1.6 lists exceptions to the duty of confidentiality, leaving
no doubt that the Model Rules contemplate express exceptions to cer-
tain rules and grant attorneys the discretion to otherwise violate cer-
tain rules under various circumstances.  For example, Rule 1.6
permits disclosure of confidential information in limited circum-
stances.56  The Model Rules also allow permissive withdrawal from
52. See Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Duffield, 644 A.2d 1186, 1193 (Pa. 1994) (“It
is well-established that dishonesty on the part of an attorney establishes his un-
fitness to continue practicing law.  Truth is the cornerstone of the judicial system;
a license to practice law requires allegiance and fidelity to truth.”) (citing Office of
Disciplinary Counsel v. Grisby, 425 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa. 1981)).
53. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2007).
54. See id. pmbl. ¶ 10, R. 1.16(a), R. 1.2(d), R. 4.1 cmt. 3.
55. Id. R. 1.6 cmt. 2.
56. See id. R. 1.6.
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representing a client in limited circumstances, but, again, it is a mat-
ter left to the sole discretion of each attorney.57  If the Model Rules
include express exceptions to some rules, it is unlikely that the Model
Rules also contemplate implied exceptions to other rules.  Similar to
Rule 1.6’s duty of confidentiality, Rule 1.8(b) addresses an attorney’s
duty of loyalty by prohibiting an attorney from using confidential cli-
ent information to the client’s disadvantage without the client’s in-
formed consent, unless the Model Rules permit or require such use.
Clearly the Model Rules place the focus of the attorney–client relation-
ship squarely on the interests of the client to establish a strong foun-
dation of faith and trust.
Part 3 of the Model Rules governs the conduct of an attorney acting
as an advocate on a client’s behalf.  Rule 3.1 requires that attorneys
only assert claims that have a basis in law and fact.  Rule 3.3 requires
advocates to exhibit candor toward tribunals, such that an attorney
cannot make false statements of fact to a tribunal58 or offer false evi-
dence.59  These rules preserve the integrity of the system of justice.60
There are no exceptions to these rules.
Part 4 of the Model Rules regulates an attorney’s transactions with
persons who are not clients.  Rule 4.1 mandates that attorneys act
honestly and truthfully when dealing with people on behalf of a client:
In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a
false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a
material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting
a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule
1.6.61
False statements or misrepresentations are not limited to outright
lies, but include half-truths or half-lies as well.62  Rule 4.2 limits the
ability of an attorney to communicate with persons who are repre-
sented by another attorney:
In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject
of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by
another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.63
This prohibition is meant to safeguard the legal system by protecting
represented persons against possible overreaching by attorneys with
interests in the legal matter, interference by other attorneys with the
represented person’s attorney–client relationship, and the ignorant
57. See id. R. 1.16(b).
58. Id. R. 3.3(a)(1).
59. Id. R. 3.3(a)(3).
60. See id. R. 3.3 cmt. 2.
61. Id. R. 4.1; see id. R. 4.1 cmt. 1.
62. Id. R. 4.1.
63. Id. R. 4.2.
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disclosure of privileged information.64  Rule 4.3, on the other hand,
governs how an attorney may ethically deal with unrepresented
persons:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by
counsel, a lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested.
When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the unrepresented
person misunderstands the lawyer’s role in the matter, the lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.  The lawyer shall not give
legal advice to an unrepresented person, other than the advice to secure coun-
sel, if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the interests of such a
person are or have a reasonable possibility of being in conflict with the inter-
ests of the client.65
To protect an unrepresented person from his own ignorant assump-
tion that an opposing attorney is somehow disinterested, this rule
simply requires an attorney to identify his client and, in some cases,
explain that his client’s interests conflict with the unrepresented per-
son’s interests.66
The Model Rules codify the concept that if an attorney cannot en-
gage in unethical conduct, then the attorney does not have the option
simply to assign the conduct to a subordinate to get the benefit of what
the attorney could not do.  If an attorney is prohibited from doing
something under the Model Rules, the general rule is that the attor-
ney cannot direct another person to perform those acts.67  In essence,
these are derivative claims in that the conduct of a third person acting
under the direction of the attorney is viewed through the lens of
whether the superior may ethically engage in such conduct.  For ex-
ample, Rule 5.1(a) requires that a managing attorney in a law firm
“make reasonable efforts to ensure” that all attorneys in the firm com-
ply with the ethics rules.68  Similarly, an attorney who supervises an-
other attorney must make reasonable efforts to ensure that the
attorney complies with the ethics rules.69  A supervisory attorney is
responsible for another attorney’s ethical violations when directing
the attorney’s unethical conduct, ratifying the unethical conduct, or
failing to take reasonable remedial action when unethical conduct
occurs.70
Notwithstanding Rule 5.1’s strictures, Rule 5.2(a) explains that a
subordinate attorney must still act as her own ethical compliance of-
ficer, regardless of the direction she receives from a supervisory attor-
ney.71  This rule contains a safe-harbor provision, however, that
64. Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 1.
65. Id. R. 4.3.
66. Id. R. 4.3 cmt. 1.
67. See id. R. 5.3.
68. Id. R. 5.1(a).
69. Id. R. 5.1(b).
70. Id. R. 5.1(c).
71. Id. R. 5.2(a).
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exempts otherwise violative conduct in situations in which a
subordinate attorney complies with a supervisory attorney’s direction
when there is a reasonable basis for concluding that the course of con-
duct is ethical.72  When the law is unclear on whether it is “reasonably
arguable” that a course of conduct is ethical (e.g., the use of attorney
deception), the Model Rules place the decision making authority for
ethics purposes on the supervisory attorney.73  If there is only one rea-
sonable answer to the ethical question—that answer being that the
proposed conduct is unethical—then no safe harbors apply, and both
the supervisory and subordinate attorneys must comply with the eth-
ics rules.74
The Model Rules do not stop with subordinate attorneys.  Rule 5.3
ensures that attorneys only use non-attorney assistants in ways that
are consistent with the attorney’s ethical obligations.75  This rule pro-
hibits an attorney from doing something through a non-attorney assis-
tant when the attorney could not engage in the conduct herself.76
Although perhaps not intuitively applicable to deceptive practices,
Rule 7.1 prohibits attorneys from making false or misleading state-
ments about their services.  Notably, even truthful statements can
still be misleading if they leave out material facts that would lead a
reasonable person to reach unsupported conclusions about the attor-
ney’s services.77  Rule 7.1 has not been applied to the attorney decep-
tion issue yet.  As you read the discussion of various cases, however,
keep Rule 7.1 in mind and consider how it could apply to an attorney’s
use of deception, particularly within the attorney–client relationship
itself.
Rule 8.4 is implicated by every dishonest or deceitful act by an at-
torney, regardless of whether the attorney acts in a representational
or non-representational capacity.  Not surprisingly, the debate over
attorney deception focuses squarely on Rule 8.4.  Generally, Part 8 of
the Model Rules seeks to maintain the integrity of the legal profession.
To safeguard that integrity, Rule 8.4 makes it unethical for an attor-
ney to “commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects,”78
“engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresen-
tation,”79 or “engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice.”80  The official comments interpret what it means to
72. See id. R. 5.2(b).
73. Id. R. 5.2 cmt. 2.
74. Id.
75. Id. R. 5.3.
76. See id. R. 5.3.
77. Id. R. 7.1 cmt. 2.
78. Id. R. 8.4(b).
79. Id. R. 8.4(c).
80. Id. R. 8.4(d).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 15 15-NOV-10 11:55
2010] TO CATCH A CRIMINAL 233
engage in illegal conduct that reflects adversely on an attorney’s fit-
ness to practice law by providing examples, such as fraud, willful fail-
ure to file an income tax return, violent offenses, dishonesty, breaches
of trust, and serious interferences with the administration of justice.81
The comments exclude from fitness issues those offenses that involve
“moral turpitude,” which might include adultery or similar offenses,
because these offenses “have no specific connection to fitness for the
practice of law.”82  Every case of attorney deception discusses Rule
8.4.
To ensure that an attorney does not seek alternative ways to shirk
her ethical responsibilities, Rule 8.4(a) prohibits an attorney from us-
ing someone else to violate the Model Rules.  In essence, the Model
Rules mean what they say and say what they mean—if it is unethical
for an attorney to do something, then it is likewise unethical for an
attorney to seek to have someone else engage in the prohibited behav-
ior on the attorney’s behalf and for the attorney’s benefit.  This is
nothing new in legal ethics.  From the first official ABA ethics code,
the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethics, attorneys were instructed to
prevent their clients from doing things that the attorney could not do,
“particularly with reference to their conduct towards [c]ourts, judicial
officers, jurors, witnesses and suitors.”83  If a client continued to do
things that the attorney could not ethically do, then the Canons of
Professional Ethics instructed the attorney to terminate the attor-
ney–client relationship.84  The deception-exception issue directly chal-
lenges this longstanding ethical principle that an attorney is
prohibited from using another person to do something that the attor-
ney may not ethically do himself.
This Article maintains that the Model Rules contain no exceptions
that authorize attorney deception, but that they should not prohibit
an attorney from directing the use of lawful deception by non-attor-
neys in limited circumstances.  This position challenges Rules 5.1, 5.2,
5.3, and 8.4(a) and their limitations on attorneys using others to do
what the attorney cannot do.  Similar to the express permissive disclo-
81. Id. R. 8.4 cmt. 2.
82. Id.
83. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 16 (1908).  Two other ethics rules reinforce the
principle that lying attorneys are not ethical attorneys.  First, Rule 8.3(a) enlists
all attorneys to act as compliance regulators through a reporting requirement.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.3(a) (2007).  When an attorney knows
that another attorney has violated the ethics rules in a way that substantially
draws into question the attorney’s “honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a law-
yer,” that attorney must be reported to the appropriate authority. Id.  Second,
the requirement that attorneys act honestly and free of deception predates their
becoming attorneys.  Rule 8.1 forbids bar applicants—those seeking admission to
the legal profession—from making false statements of material facts or allowing
bar authorities to misapprehend certain facts. Id. R. 8.1.
84. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 16 (1908).
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sure and permissive withdrawal exceptions, the Model Rules would
best serve its function by having the scope of any permissive investi-
gation deception exception expressly defined in the Model Rules
rather than through interpretation on a case-by-case basis—an ap-
proach virtually guaranteed to create ad-hoc implied exceptions.  I
propose having a full, open, and fair debate of the attorney deception
issue in direct sunlight, rather than having individual attorneys
secretly entering the debate where the good of a single client, rather
than the good of the profession or the justice system, might take prior-
ity.  If an attorney who unilaterally chooses to use deception can jus-
tify that deception in private, then that same attorney should have
little difficulty justifying that deception in public.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE SCATTERED HISTORY OF
CONFRONTING THE ETHICS OF ATTORNEY DECEPTION
The facts of the Haddock case are really nothing new.  A long-run-
ning debate on whether attorneys may ethically engage in deception
has been unresolved and clouded in uncertainty for years.85  One state
supreme court has acknowledged that the issue of whether attorneys
may ethically engage in deception is “a matter that is vexing to the
Bar, government lawyers, and lawyers in the private practice of
law.”86  One bar committee has “recognize[d] that there is no nation-
wide consensus” on the use of deception by attorneys.87  Unfortu-
nately, the contours of this debate have been ill-defined, and countless
participants in a number of forums have addressed various subtopics
in the debate.  No real consensus has emerged on whether and when
attorneys may lie or deceive.  Indeed, little progress has been made in
forging a systematic, formal discussion by far-ranging participants to
answer the ultimate question on deception.  Instead of deferring a dis-
cussion of the issue because of its difficulty or, worse, allowing discipli-
nary bodies to address the issue on a case-by-case basis, the legal
profession must engage in an organized and systematic discussion to
deal with the systemic issues implicated by attorney deception.88  At-
85. See In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 979 (Or. 2002) (noting that the issue of whether an
attorney may ethically engage in deception by misrepresenting his identity or
purpose to gather information “has been festering for some time”).
86. Id. at 976.
87. N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm’n on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. No. 737 (2007),
available at http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf.
88. Some commentators have started the ball rolling on debating the attorney decep-
tion issue. See, e.g., William H. Fortune, Lawyers, Covert Activity, and Choice of
Evils, 32 J. LEGAL PROF. 99 (2008) (promoting an amendment of ethical rules to
establish a necessity defense in disciplinary cases); Monroe H. Freedman, In
Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties,
and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771, 782 (2006) (arguing the
existence of situations requiring an attorney to contravene disciplinary rules);
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torneys owe that to each other, the system of justice, and the Ameri-
can public.
It might help to place a few general markers on the terrain to see
what ground has been covered.  To that end, this Part analyzes attor-
ney deception of a client within the attorney–client  relationship, at-
torney deception of a third person while representing a client, an
attorney’s direction of third persons to employ lawful deception, and
attorney deception when the attorney is acting in a non-representa-
tional capacity.
A. You Think I’m Your Attorney: Deception within the
Attorney–Client Relationship
The most disturbing use of deception is within the attorney–client
relationship itself (i.e., deceiving a person into believing that he is be-
ing represented faithfully by an attorney, when in fact he is not).  Be-
cause the attorney–client relationship holds a special place in the
public’s view of attorneys, eroding the foundation of trust built upon
that relationship can only harm society if deception is left unchecked.
For example, the Supreme Court of Colorado reviewed a disciplinary
case in which a prosecutor engaged in dishonesty and deception by
falsely acting as a public defender to catch a grisly murderer.89  In
response, the court rendered a bright-line decision that attorney de-
ception is not tolerated in Colorado: “Purposeful deception by an attor-
ney licensed in our state is intolerable, even when it is undertaken as
a part of attempting to secure the surrender of a murder suspect.  A
prosecutor may not deceive an unrepresented person by impersonat-
ing a public defender.”90  The court concluded that the offending attor-
ney had “violated a duty he owed the public, the legal system, and the
profession.”91  The court also made clear that the attorney’s lying “for
David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for De-
ception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of
the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation under the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995) (discussing the ethical consid-
erations of misrepresentation in gathering evidence and undercover
investigations); Douglas R. Richmond, Deceptive Lawyering, 74 U. CIN. L. REV.
577 (2005) (addressing undercover investigations and surreptitious recording by
attorneys); Barry R.Temkin, Deception in Undercover Investigations: Conduct-
Based vs. Status-Based Ethical Analysis, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 123 (2008) (ad-
dressing indirect attorney deception within the rules of ethics); Livingston
Keithley, Comment, Should a Lawyer Ever Be Allowed to Lie? People v. Pautler
and a Proposed Duress Exception, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 301 (2004) (suggesting a
duress exception to violations of ethical rules in rare situations).  I contend that
the ABA must now pick up the ball and take action on the issue of attorney decep-
tion by adopting an express investigation deception exception to the Model Rules.
89. In re Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002).
90. Id. at 1176.
91. Id. at 1183.
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what he thought was a good reason does not obscure the fact that he
lied” and that the attorney’s “role of prosecutor makes him an instru-
ment of the legal system, a representative of the system of justice.”92
The court cautioned that the attorney’s unethical use of deception
could “perpetuate the public’s misperception” of the legal profession, a
violation of each attorney’s “public and professional trust.”93
What prompted a prosecutor to engage in deception in the first
place?  After viewing three women whose heads had been crushed by a
killer wielding a wood-splitting maul, Chief Deputy District Attorney
Mark Pautler learned that the man who had killed these women in
cold blood and created the horrific scene was William Neal.94  Pautler
also learned that Neal had abducted and tortured the three victims
slowly, raped a fourth victim after splitting open one victim’s skull,
and left instructions with the fourth victim to page Neal when the po-
lice arrived.95  After police paged and contacted Neal, Deputy Sheriff
Cheryl Moore spoke with Neal for three-and-a-half hours, learning the
details of the murder while passing messages to Pautler.96  When en-
couraged to surrender, Neal made clear that he would not surrender
without talking to his former attorney or a public defender.97  Al-
though Moore promised to secure a public defender for Neal, she actu-
ally concocted a ruse to have Pautler act as the requested public
defender instead.98
Although Pautler knew that a defense attorney would advise Neal
not to talk to authorities, Pautler nevertheless agreed to impersonate
a public defender and deceive Neal into believing that Pautler was a
public defender by the name of Mark Palmer.99  The deception
worked.100  During Pautler’s deceptive conversation with Neal, Neal
requested that his attorney be present when he surrendered, to which
Pautler responded, “Right, I’ll be present.”101  When Neal surren-
dered, Pautler instructed law enforcement officials to tell Neal that
his attorney was present, even though Pautler did not meet with Neal
and neither did any other attorney.102  At no point did Pautler reveal
to Neal the deception used to garner his surrender.103  When an ac-
tual public defender later represented Neal and informed him that no
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1176.
95. Id. at 1176–77.
96. Id. at 1177.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1177–78.
101. Id. at 1177.
102. Id. at 1178.
103. Id.
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Mark Palmer existed, it was no surprise that the public defender “had
difficulty establishing a trusting relationship with” Neal.104  Neal
later chose to dismiss the public defender and represent himself, re-
sulting in a conviction for the murders and a sentence of death.105
Based on these facts, Colorado’s Office of Attorney Regulation
Counsel charged Pautler with violating Colorado’s equivalents to
Rules 4.3 and 8.4(c) for how he dealt with the unrepresented Neal and
for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrep-
resentation.106  Showing no signs of remorse, Pautler testified that if
he were presented with the same circumstances, he would still engage
in the deception.107  After deciding that Pautler had violated Rules 4.3
and 8.4(c), the hearing board meted out relatively minor sanctions.108
Pautler appealed the decision to the Supreme Court of Colorado.
Leaving no doubt how seriously it viewed Pautler’s deception, the
court set the stage for its analysis with this powerful introduction:
The jokes, cynicism, and falling public confidence related to lawyers and
the legal system may signal that we are not living up to our obligation [to
maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct]. . . .  [Indeed, the legal pro-
fession is trying] to emphasize that truthfulness, honesty and candor are the
core of the core values of the legal profession.  Lawyers themselves are recog-
nizing that the public perception that lawyers twist words to meet their own
goals and pay little attention to the truth, strikes at the very heart of the
profession—as well as at the heart of the system of justice.  Lawyers serve our
system of justice, and if lawyers are dishonest, then there is a perception that
the system, too, must be dishonest.109
With that introduction, the court stated that Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition
on dishonesty and deception is “devoid of any exception,” such that
Pautler’s justification defense had no merit.110  The court declared
that attorneys do not have the right to choose between deception and
forthrightness.  The court made clear that even noble motives do not
excuse departures from the Model Rules, and that even prosecutors
like Pautler “cannot involve themselves in deception, even with self-
less motives, lest they run afoul of Rule 8.4(c).”111  When confronted
with Pautler’s argument that Rule 8.4(c) contains an imminent public-
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1178–79 (internal quotations omitted).  There can be no doubt that the le-
gal profession should strive for a positive public perception of attorneys.  Honesty
and character certainly build trust and respect.  To that end, the public should
not perceive attorneys as a bunch of selfish liars.  Indeed, society’s viewpoint
dims when a joke such as the following rings true to some people:  “How do you
know when an attorney is lying?  The attorney’s lips are moving.”  Although such
humor is hopefully undeserved, the legal profession can do better.
110. Id. at 1179.
111. Id. at 1180.
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harm exception to justify his deception, the court was “adamant that
when presented with choices, at least one of which conforms to the
Rules, an attorney must not select an option that involves deceit or
misrepresentation.”112  After stating that an attorney’s ethical stan-
dards leave “no room for deceiving Neal in this manner,” the court
concluded, “Pautler cannot compromise his integrity, and that of our
profession, irrespective of the cause.”113  The court rejected the oppor-
tunity to create an implied deception exception: “Both of the rules
under which Pautler was charged are imperative, not permissive in
application.  Compliance with their mandatory provisions is required
and is not subject to the exercise of discretion by the lawyer.”114
The Colorado Supreme Court dismissed any notion that a prosecu-
tor has the unilateral right to engage in deception to catch criminals:
The Rules of Professional Conduct apply to anyone licensed to practice law
in Colorado. . . .  The Rules speak to the ‘role’ of attorneys in society; however
we do not understand such language as permitting attorneys to move in and
out of ethical obligations according to their daily activities. . . .  The obliga-
tions concomitant with a license to practice law trump obligations concomi-
tant with a lawyer’s other duties, even apprehending criminals.115
Rejecting any claim that the court’s bright-line rule against attorney
deception was too rigid an interpretation of Rule 8.4(c), the court an-
nounced that it stood “resolute against any suggestion that licensed
attorneys in [the] state may deceive or lie or misrepresent, regardless
of their reasons for doing so.”116
Finally, the court condemned Pautler’s conduct of representing the
State of Colorado as a prosecutor while dealing with Neal, an unrepre-
112. Id. at 1180–81.
113. Id. at 1181; see also State v. Galati, 319 A.2d 220, 223 (N.J. 1974) (“[W]e must
notice that in matters of ethics and professional probity, the cause and effect im-
pact upon the public consciousness is almost, perhaps quite, as important as the
actual fact.”).  The Galati court further noted that “the fundamental principle of
disinterested justice which is the bulwark of our judicial system” mandates that
“a community without certainty in the true administration of justice is a commu-
nity without justice.” Id. (quoting In re Spitalnick, 308 A.2d 1, 2 (N.J. 1973))
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Highlighting the importance of perception,
the court went on to indicate that “it is vital that justice be administered not only
with a balance that is clear and true but also with such eminently fair procedures
that the litigants and the public will always have confidence that it is being so
administered.” Id. (quoting State v. Deutsch, 168 A.2d 12, 20 (N.J. 1961)) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted).  In short, “justice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.” Id. (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).  “In a free democracy the administration of justice
rests very largely not only on Constitution and laws, but upon public confidence
in its integrity and impartiality in execution.” Id.
114. Id. (quoting People v. Pautler, 35 P.3d 571, 580 (Colo. 2001) (decision of the disci-
plinary hearing board)).
115. Id. at 1182.
116. Id.
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sented person, as a clear violation of Rule 4.3.117  The court also
bemoaned the fact that Pautler never informed Neal to retain an at-
torney, and more troubling, purported to represent Neal in the matter
even though Pautler’s only goal in the matter was to arrest and prose-
cute Neal.118  Ruling that there are no implied exceptions to Rule 4.3
that could authorize Pautler’s deception in dealing with the unrepre-
sented Neal, the court concluded that Pautler’s conduct was undoubt-
edly unethical.119
The Colorado Supreme Court’s unequivocal rejection of Pautler’s
use of deception to create an apparent attorney–client relationship
cannot be understated.  Although this Article does not argue that
statements by prospective or current clients about committing future
crimes are protected by the attorney–client  privilege,120 any discus-
sion of that privilege is misplaced—or at least seriously premature—
when confronting the issue of whether an attorney may ethically
deceive a person into believing that there is an attorney–client rela-
tionship with the goal of using communications against the apparent
client.  When a client—prospective or current—seeks to violate the
law with the attorney’s assistance, the attorney must counsel against
the unlawful behavior or withdraw.121  Public policy could not tolerate
the attorney’s use of deception to create an apparent attorney–client
relationship simply to take down the client.
The Supreme Court of Colorado was confronted with just that type
of case in People v. Smith,122 a case that paralleled the Haddock situa-
tion.  James Smith, a criminal-defense attorney suspected of using
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. This claim would be unsupported by public policy and case law. See, e.g., United
States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562–63 (1989) (explaining the limits of the attor-
ney–client privilege in term of future wrongdoing).  “[S]ince the [attorney–client]
privilege has the effect of withholding relevant information from the fact finder,
it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose.” Id. (quoting Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The attorney–client privilege must necessarily protect the confidences of wrong-
doers, but the reason for that protection—the centrality of open client and attor-
ney communication to the proper functioning of our adversary system of justice—
‘ceases to operate at a certain point, namely, where the desired advice refers not
to prior wrongdoing, but to future wrongdoing.’ ” Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVI-
DENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).  “It is the purpose of the crime–fraud
exception to the attorney–client privilege to assure that the seal of secrecy be-
tween lawyer and client does not extend to communications made for the purpose
of getting advice for the commission of a fraud or crime.” Id.  (internal quotations
omitted).  “It is a truism that while the attorney–client privilege stands firm for
client’s revelations of past conduct, it cannot be used to shield ongoing or in-
tended future criminal conduct.”  United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th
Cir. 1996).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2007).
122. 778 P.2d 685 (Colo. 1989).
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and dealing cocaine, agreed to act as an undercover government in-
formant to secretly record conversations with a former client.123
Smith cooperated with law enforcement authorities partly out of fear
that criminal drug charges would be brought against him if he did not
cooperate.124  Smith only agreed to record his former client’s conversa-
tions after the attorney general’s office assured him that his conduct
would not violate the Model Rules.125  Smith’s deceptive undercover
efforts worked.  His former client spoke freely and incriminatingly to
Smith while on tape and subsequently pleaded guilty to felony drug
charges.126
The Supreme Court of Colorado was not amused with Smith’s con-
duct, regardless of whether government attorneys had condoned the
undercover deception.  In holding that Smith’s deception in recording
his conversations with his former client had violated Colorado’s
equivalent to Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition on conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, the court revealed how
Smith’s conduct could undermine society’s trust in the attorney–client
relationship:
While [Smith] no longer represented [his former client], the conduct in all
probability would not have occurred had [Smith] not relied upon the trust and
confidence placed in him by [his former client] as a result of the recently com-
pleted attorney–client relationship between the two.  The undisclosed use of a
recording device necessarily involves elements of deception and trickery which
do not comport with the high standards of candor and fairness to which all
attorneys are bound.127
The court further condemned any effort by private attorneys “to deal
dishonestly and deceitfully with clients, former clients and others,” be-
cause such deception “would fatally undermine the foundation of trust
and confidentiality that is essential to the attorney–client relationship
in the context of civil as well as criminal proceedings.”128
The Supreme Court of Iowa also was not amused by an attorney’s
decision to use deception of the apparent attorney–client relationship
to take down the unsuspecting client for the benefit of the attorney.
Committee on Professional Ethics v. Mollman129 involved an attorney
named Michael Mollman who had used cocaine and marijuana with
his friend and former client, Edward Johnson.  When federal law-en-
forcement authorities interviewed Mollman about his criminal con-
duct, he agreed to secretly record a conversation with Johnson.  The
123. Id. at 685–86.
124. Id. at 686.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 686–87.
128. Id. at 687; see also id. at 688 (Erickson, J., dissenting) (reiterating that Smith’s
breach of “the confidential attorney–client relationship” brought “disrespect and
a dishonor to the legal profession”).
129. 488 N.W.2d 168 (Iowa 1992).
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federal agents prepared a script according to which Mollman would
suggest to Johnson “that he and Johnson get their stories straight
about their past drug usage.”130  The ruse worked, as Johnson incrim-
inated himself on tape when talking to Mollman, and resulted in a
felony conviction for drug dealing.131  After Johnson’s conviction, he
filed ethics charges against Mollman for the deception.132
In addressing those ethics charges, which included violations of
Iowa’s equivalents to Rules 1.6, 1.8, and 8.4(c), the Iowa Supreme
Court acknowledged that the relationship between Mollman and
Johnson was unclear—similar to the Haddock situation.  Even though
Mollman issued a Haddock-like disclaimer that he was not acting as
Johnson’s attorney, “Johnson testified to his firm belief that Mollman
was his attorney, as well as his friend, and that he had confided in
him freely about personal matters with the expectation that his confi-
dence would not be betrayed.”133  Even if no attorney–client relation-
ship existed between Mollman and Johnson during the recorded
conversations, the court explained that this fact did not allow
Mollman to “shed his ethical responsibility” to act honestly without
deception.134  Indeed, the court recognized that the only reason “that
Mollman was able to draw incriminating statements out of Johnson
[was] precisely because their conversation centered on the legal impli-
cations” of their conduct, with Johnson clearly looking to Mollman “for
guidance, if not legal advice, on these matters and, in doing so,
ma[king] the admissions federal agents wanted.”135  Noting that
Mollman secured Johnson’s incriminating admissions only through
deception, the court stated that employing “trickery” and deception
“outside the strict bounds of an attorney–client relationship [was] . . .
of only passing significance.”136  Recognizing that Mollman decep-
tively used the appearance of an attorney–client relationship “to save
his own skin [by luring] Johnson into a trap set by federal law enforce-
ment officials,” the court held that Mollman’s deception had violated
Rule 8.4(c).137  The court declared, “Fundamental honesty is the base
line and mandatory requirement to serve in the legal profession.”138
130. Id. at 169–70.
131. Id. at 170.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 171.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also id. at 173 (Carter, J., concurring) (stating that “irrespective of
whether attorney Mollman communicated a disclaimer of any potential attor-
ney–client relationship, Johnson nevertheless was relying on Mollman for legal
advice” and thus “undoubtedly made statements that otherwise would not have
been forthcoming”).
138. Id. at 171 (quoting Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Wegner, 469 N.W.2d 678
(Iowa 1991)).
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Deception within the apparent attorney–client relationship strikes
at the heart of society’s perception of attorneys.  Attorneys must en-
gage in conduct that seeks to increase the public’s faith, trust, and
confidence in attorneys, which in turn increases faith, trust, and confi-
dence in the administration of justice and rule of law.  The public has
a strong perception that they can speak fully and frankly with their
attorneys.  The purpose of the attorney–client privilege itself is to
drive clients to attorneys for a full and frank discussion of the relevant
facts, laws, and issues such that the attorney can bring as much value
as possible in addressing the client’s cause.139  The attorney–client re-
lationship stands at the foundation of trust that supports society’s un-
derstanding of the privilege.  Even though we are not confronted with
a privilege issue in the first instance, we are confronted with a ques-
tion that could erode the foundation of the attorney–client relation-
ship itself—does society expect, or even condone, attorneys using
deception against their own clients to investigate suspected
wrongdoing?140
As explained by the Supreme Court of Ohio, “[I]t is the court’s duty
to safeguard the preservation of the attorney–client relationship.”141
Accordingly, the court reasoned that “[i]n doing so, a court helps to
maintain public confidence in the legal profession and assists in pro-
tecting the integrity of the judicial proceeding.”142  Another court has
echoed the importance of protecting the attorney–client relationship:
“The [attorney–client] relationship is one of trust and confidence, and
139. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).  “The attorney–client
privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications known to
the common law.” Id. (quoting 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev.
1961)).  The Supreme Court of the United States has been crystal clear on the
societal significance of the attorney–client relationship:
[The purpose of the attorney–client privilege] is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and adminis-
tration of justice.  The privilege recognizes that sound legal advice or ad-
vocacy serves public ends and that such advice or advocacy depends
upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the client.
Id.
140. See People v. Gerold, 107 N.E. 165, 177 (Ill. 1914) (“It is the glory of the legal
profession that its fidelity to its clients can be depended upon; that a man may
safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon his rights in litigation with
absolute assurance that that lawyer’s tongue is tied from ever discussing it.”).
141. Kala v. Aluminum Smelting & Refining Co., 688 N.E.2d 258, 262 (Ohio 1998)
(citing Am. Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1971)); see
also Elan Transdermal Ltd. v. Cygnus Therapeutic Sys., 809 F. Supp. 1383, 1390
(N.D. Cal. 1992) (quoting In re Complex Asbestos Litigation, 283 Cal. Rptr. 732,
740 (1991)) (explaining that California’s ethics rules and law are designed “to
preserve the public trust in the scrupulous administration of justice and the in-
tegrity of the bar”).
142. Kala, 688 N.E.2d 258, 262 (citing United States v. Agosto, 675 F.2d 965, 969 (8th
Cir. 1982)).
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it is the duty of the courts to preserve it upon a high plane of moral
responsibility for the protection of the public.”143  The Model Rules
also consider the importance of the attorney–client relationship:
A lawyer’s responsibilities as a representative of clients, an officer of the
legal system and a public citizen are usually harmonious. . . .  So also, a law-
yer can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public
interest because people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed
their legal obligations, when they know their communications will be
private.144
It probably goes without saying that law enforcement investiga-
tions would increase their productivity if they simply focused on hav-
ing criminal-defense attorneys act as undercover government
informants against their clients.  There would be abundantly fertile
fields for picking up criminals if we were to use their own attorneys
against them.  Because criminal-defense clients would, at least ini-
tially, operate under the assumption that their attorneys represent
their best interests against the state, a client would speak freely with-
out any reservation that his attorney actually works for the state in
the case against him.  However, this cross-your-fingers-and-hope-the-
clients-don’t-find-out approach to attorney deception would have lim-
ited use over the long-term.  The use of attorney deception within the
attorney–client relationship would strike, perhaps, a fatal blow to the
foundation of trust that the public has in that relationship.  Undoubt-
edly, generations of building trust and confidence in the legal profes-
sion can be eroded in short order.  The result would be criminal clients
who have no trust or faith that attorneys are on their side, much like
Neal’s response when he learned about Pautler’s deception, or John-
son’s response when he learned about Mollman’s deception.
Like the popular children’s game Jenga, of all of the building
blocks to our justice system, the block that society should not touch is
the cornerstone—a client should expect that her attorney is on her
side and is not actively promoting the attorney–client relationship as
a ruse.145  To pull the cornerstone is to risk toppling the legal profes-
sion itself.  We must protect the attorney–client relationship at all
costs to build the perception that our judicial system is honest and
fair.  We want to encourage citizens to seek attorneys in confidence for
assistance in complying with the law and in getting a fair shake when
there are allegations that the law has been violated.  Although attor-
neys undoubtedly strive to help their clients comply with the law, cli-
143. Riddle v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Ky. Ct. App. 1993) (quoting In re
Gilbert, 118 S.W.2d 535, 537 (Ky. 1938)).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶8 (2007).
145. See Lorain County Bar Ass’n v. Noll, 821 N.E.2d 988, 992 (Ohio 2004) (“The inter-
ests of the lawyer’s clients—not the lawyer’s own personal interests—must al-
ways come first.  A lawyer must be vigilant at all times in protecting the welfare
of clients.”).
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ents often unwittingly engage in criminal conduct.  Notwithstanding
the possibility that clients may violate the law, the “valuable social
service of counseling clients and bringing them into compliance with
the law cannot be performed effectively if clients are scared to tell
their lawyers what they are doing, for fear that their lawyers will be
turned into government informants.”146
We dare not trample on the precarious attorney–client relationship
just to make it easier to catch criminals.  No deception exception
should ever condone Haddock-, Pautler-, Smith-, or Mollman-like be-
havior in using deception to create an apparent attorney–client rela-
tionship in order to catch a criminal.
B. You Can’t Trust Me: Deception when Acting as an
Attorney for a Client
Although it seems fundamental that public policy cannot support
an attorney’s deceptive use of the attorney–client relationship against
an unsuspecting client, what about an attorney’s use of deception on a
client’s behalf?  Attorneys may find themselves wishing to use decep-
tion to discover helpful information for a client.  When an attorney
seeks to use deception to help a client, do the Model Rules impliedly
authorize that deception?  I agree with most authorities that there is
no such implied exception.
The Supreme Court of Oregon addressed a disciplinary case
against an attorney who used deception to try to uncover insurance
fraud in the course of representing clients.147  Ironically, the attorney
was introduced to the deception idea when he witnessed government
attorneys supervising the use of deception to gather evidence to show
that the attorney’s clients had engaged in fraud.148  While acting as
an attorney for chiropractors who had been charged with fraud,
Daniel Gatti filed an ethics complaint against various government at-
torneys with the Oregon State Bar.149  Gatti claimed that the govern-
ment attorneys had acted unethically by advising undercover
investigators to pose as employees or injured persons to discover infor-
mation on fraudulent workers compensation claims.150  The Oregon
State Bar’s Office of Disciplinary Counsel informed Gatti that al-
though it “is not clear” whether government attorneys “have more lati-
tude” in engaging in deception than private attorneys, the counsel’s
“preliminary conclusion” was that because government agencies “have
public authority to root out possible fraud, then [government] attor-
neys assisting [an agency] in this endeavor are not acting unethically
146. United States v. Chen, 99 F.3d 1495, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995).
147. In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 968–80 (Or. 2000) (en banc).
148. Id. at 969–70.
149. Id. at 969.
150. Id.
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in providing advice on how to conduct a legal undercover opera-
tion.”151  The State Professional Responsibility Board later informed
Gatti that it, too, concluded that there was no evidence that the gov-
ernment attorneys had violated Oregon’s ethics rules.152  Based on
Gatti’s subsequent conduct, he took these responses to heart.
While representing a client at a later date, Gatti suspected that a
company called Comprehensive Medical Review (CMR) was using
non-medical personnel to deny medical claims submitted to State
Farm Insurance Company.153  Even though Gatti made no effort to
further study whether an attorney “who misrepresents his or her iden-
tity or purpose violates lawyer disciplinary rules,” he nonetheless used
deception in making a series of three investigatory telephone calls to
CMR.154  Gatti first called Dr. Becker, a chiropractor who served as a
medical reviewer for CMR, because Gatti believed that State Farm
had denied a client’s claim based on Becker’s report.155  Gatti recorded
a telephone conversation in which he inquired as to Becker’s qualifica-
tions and lied about being a chiropractor himself.156  Gatti made a sec-
ond phone call to Adams, a CMR executive.157  During this telephone
conversation, which he likewise recorded, Gatti again lied by claiming
that he was a doctor who performed independent medical examina-
tions, reviewed insurance claims, saw patients, was referred to CMR
by Becker and State Farm, and wanted to work for CMR as a medical
reviewer.158  Believing that Gatti was a chiropractor who could work
for CMR, Adams referred Gatti to a CMR employee named House-
holder.159  Gatti then called Householder to discuss employment with
CMR, but Householder knew that Gatti actually was an attorney who
was not interested in working for CMR.160  Based in part upon his
telephone conversations with Becker, Adams, and Householder, Gatti
later filed a federal lawsuit alleging fraud against CMR, State Farm,
and Householder.161
A month later, Adams filed an ethics complaint against Gatti with
the Oregon State Bar.162  Gatti defended his conduct by stating that
he never misrepresented to CMR that he was a doctor, claiming that
the statement was true because he was a doctor of jurisprudence.163
151. Id. (emphasis omitted).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 969–70.
154. Id. at 970.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 971.
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Further, Gatti claimed that even if he engaged in misrepresentations,
he acted ethically because he “was conducting a fraud investigation on
behalf of several clients.”164  The transcripts of Gatti’s telephone calls
to CMR left no doubt that he used deception during the calls.165
Based on Gatti’s deception during his telephone calls, he was charged
with unethically engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, de-
ceit, or misrepresentation in violation of Oregon’s equivalent to Rule
8.4(c) and knowingly making a false statement of law or fact while
representing a client in violation of Oregon’s equivalent to Rule
4.1(a).166  Gatti allegedly misrepresented that he was a chiropractor,
performed independent medical examinations, wanted to work for
CMR, performed case reviews, and saw patients.167  It was also al-
leged that Gatti “failed to disclose that he was a lawyer, that he was
preparing to sue CMR, and that he hoped that he would obtain infor-
mation from the telephone calls that he could use in claims against
CMR and Adams.”168
In addressing these ethics charges, the Oregon Supreme Court con-
fronted the substance of Gatti’s argument that he did not violate the
ethics rules because he merely misrepresented his identity and pur-
pose to obtain information in his fraud investigation.169  Drawing a
bright line against attorney deception, the court had little difficulty in
deciding that Gatti violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in conduct involv-
ing dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation.170  The court
recognized that Gatti intentionally misrepresented material facts and
engaged in deception when he spoke to Becker and Adams to entice
them into providing damaging information about CMR.171  The court
spent little time explaining its holding that Gatti acted unethically
while representing a client by lying that he was a chiropractor, saw
patients, performed independent medical examinations, and wanted
164. Id.
165. Id. at 972.
166. Id. at 973 (quoting Oregon’s equivalent to Rules 8.4(c) and 4.1(a)).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.  The Oregon Supreme Court’s first order of business was deciding whether the
state bar was estopped from pursuing its claim against Gatti because of how it
handled his ethics complaints against the government attorneys. Id. at 972–73.
Deflecting that argument, the court concluded that Oregon law did not authorize
attorneys to misrepresent their identity while practicing law and that the state
bar had never informed Gatti that attorneys “in the private practice of law may
misrepresent their identity or purpose in investigating a matter.” Id.  Addition-
ally, the court noted that any advice an attorney received from disciplinary coun-
sel would not constitute a defense to a disciplinary violation. Id.  (citing In re
Ainsworth, 614 P.2d 1127, 1133 (Or. 1980) (en banc)).  In essence, the court was
eager to rebut Gatti’s claim that attorney deception was authorized by Oregon’s
ethics rules.
170. Id. at 973–74.
171. Id.
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to work for CMR.172  The court declared that Gatti had no authority to
misrepresent his “identity and purpose when contacting someone who
is likely to be adverse to the lawyer’s client.”173
After concluding that Gatti’s deception violated the black-letter
ethics rules, the court addressed Gatti’s contention that the prohibi-
tion on attorney deception contains an implied investigation exception
that allows private attorneys to “root out evil.”174  Numerous constitu-
encies filed amicus briefs to support a holding that recognized an in-
vestigation exception to ethical restraints on attorney deception.  For
example, the United States Attorney for the District of Oregon, the
Attorney General for the State of Oregon, the Oregon Consumer
League, the Fair Housing Counsel of Oregon, the Oregon Law Center,
and numerous individual attorneys all endorsed as behaving ethically
attorneys who engage in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresenta-
tion—at least as to the attorney’s identity and purpose—when investi-
gating unlawful conduct.175  Indeed, the premise for the investigation
exception lies in the idea that deception might be the only way to de-
termine if a person is violating the law, such that the public only
stands to benefit by attorney deception.176  From these arguments
alone, the scope of the investigation exception would authorize public
and private attorneys to freely engage in deception to investigate sus-
pected criminal violations, violations of anti-discrimination statutes,
and anyone else “who is the subject of an investigation for the purpose
of gathering facts before filing suit.”177  From a fair and simple read-
ing of these arguments, this investigation exception would permit any
attorney to engage in deception whenever someone might be violating
the law.178
The court noted that each justice was a member of the Oregon Bar,
some justices had served as government attorneys, and other justices
had worked in private practice before joining the judiciary.179  Based
on the diverse experiences of its members, the court readily recognized
“that there are circumstances in which misrepresentations, often in
the form of false statements of fact by those who investigate violations
of the law, are useful means for uncovering unlawful and unfair prac-
172. Id. at 974.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 974–75; In re PRB Docket No. 2007-046, 989 A.2d 523, 530 (Vt. 2009) (ac-
knowledging “that there may be circumstances in which misrepresentations that
facially violate the [Model Rules] are useful, perhaps even necessary, to the func-
tioning of the law-enforcement and judicial systems”).
176. Gatti, 8 P.3d at 975.
177. Id. (quoting Or. Consumer League et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents, In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966 (Or. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 976.
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tices, and that lawyers in both the public and private sectors have re-
lied on such tactics.”180  Notwithstanding that line of reasoning, the
court refused to create an implied deception exception:
Faithful adherence to the wording of [our ethics rules] and this court’s case
law does not permit recognition of an exception for any lawyer to engage in
dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or false statements.  In our view,
this court should not create an exception to the rules by judicial decree.  In-
stead, any exception must await the full debate that is contemplated by the
process for adopting and amending [Oregon’s ethics rules] . . . .  Those discipli-
nary rules . . . apply to all members of the Bar, without exception.181
Rejecting an implied investigation deception exception, the court held
that Gatti acted unethically when he engaged in deception.182
After holding that Gatti violated the ethics rules through his de-
ception, the court addressed the appropriate sanction.183  The court
explained that a guiding purpose of attorney discipline is to protect
clients, the public, the administration of justice, and the legal profes-
sion from attorneys who do not ethically discharge their duties.184
Noting that the public expects attorneys to act honestly, the court de-
cided that Gatti violated that duty by intentionally deceiving, misrep-
resenting his identity and purpose, and lying to Becker and Adams.185
The court also recognized that Gatti used deception solely to gain ac-
cess to confidential information of CMR that would negatively impact
its legal rights.186  The court recognized, however, that Gatti’s use of
deception arose out of his belief that he could ethically conduct a “pri-
vate sting”187 to “root out evil.”188  According to the court, Gatti “sin-
cerely believed, and still believes, that lawyers must be permitted to
make misrepresentations and false statements of identity and purpose
to discover information without violating the disciplinary rules.”189
The court stated that significant suspensions from practicing law are
routine sanctions for engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
180. Id.
181. Id. (internal citations omitted); see also In re PRB Docket No. 2007-046, 989 A.2d
523, 530 (Vt. 2009) (announcing that a court is the wrong forum in which to
amend the Model Rules; instead, because change should come “through a process
that allows input from, and collaboration among, all of the groups potentially
affected by a rule change,” the court established a joint committee “to consider
whether the rules should be amended to allow for some investigatory misrepre-
sentations, and, if so, by whom and under what circumstances”).
182. Gatti, 8 P.3d at 976–77.
183. Id. at 977–80.
184. Id. at 977 (citing JOINT COMM. ON PROF’L SANCTIONS, AM. BAR. ASS’N, STANDARDS
FOR IMPOSING LAWYER SANCTIONS 1.1 (1991)).
185. Id. at 977–78.
186. Id. at 978.
187. Id. at 979.
188. Id. at 974.
189. Id.
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deceit, or misrepresentation and making false statements of fact.190
Notwithstanding the seriousness of Gatti’s ethical misconduct, the
court recognized that Gatti was not alone in subjectively, yet errone-
ously, believing that an attorney has the implied right to use decep-
tion to investigate suspected wrongdoing.191
Concluding that Gatti’s case “brought to the surface an issue that
has been festering for some time, namely, whether any lawyer may
misrepresent his or her identity or purpose to gather information
without violating the [ethics rules],” the court acknowledged that
Gatti was joined by both public and private attorneys who “in good
faith have held the mistaken belief that they ethically are permitted
to misrepresent their identity and purpose, and to encourage others to
do so, to acquire information.”192  Treating Gatti under the old saying
that “there but by the Grace of God go I” and stating that “it is a fortu-
ity that [Gatti], rather than some other Oregon lawyer, is the subject
of these proceedings,” the court held that Gatti deserved only a public
reprimand for his unethical misconduct.193
Shortly following Gatti, the Oregon Supreme Court again con-
fronted a disciplinary case involving attorney deception.  In the case of
In re Ositis,194 a private attorney named Andrew Ositis hired an in-
vestigator to use deception to interview a potential party to a legal
dispute.  Ositis maintained that Oregon’s equivalent to Rule 8.4(c)
“should not be interpreted to apply to misrepresentations made di-
rectly or indirectly by a lawyer that go solely to the lawyer’s identity
and purpose and that are made for the purpose of gathering informa-
tion from potential adversaries before the institution of a legal ac-
tion.”195  Following Gatti in rejecting an implied deception exception,
the court held that Ositis had violated Rule 8.4(c) by engaging in con-
duct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation, because
misrepresentation as to “identity and purpose by nondisclosure” is no
less unethical than doing so by “affirmative falsehood.”196  Addition-
ally, the court held that Ositis had violated Oregon’s equivalent to
Rule 8.4(a) by trying to circumvent the ethics rules by using another
person to employ the deception.197  Thus, the court made clear that
there was no investigation deception exception to the Model Rules and
that attorneys had no authority to direct an investigator to use decep-
tion, even if such deception is otherwise lawful.  To be sure, the court
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 979–80.
194. 40 P.3d 500, 501 (Or. 2002).
195. Id. at 502.
196. Id. at 502–03.
197. Id. at 503–04.
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was applying the longstanding principle that an attorney cannot as-
sign to someone else what the attorney cannot ethically do himself.
In response to the Gatti case, constituencies in Oregon openly de-
bated the issue of attorney deception and significantly changed its
laws and ethics rules.  In the summer of 2001, Oregon passed a law
that authorized government attorneys to engage in deception and mis-
representation to effectively enforce the state’s laws.198  Showcasing
the importance of attorney deception to effective law enforcement, the
legislature declared that this law was an emergency piece of legisla-
tion that was “necessary for the immediate preservation of the public
peace, health and safety.”199  Notably, Oregon refused to extend the
deception exception to private attorneys, leaving only government at-
torneys with the authority to employ deception to root out wrongdo-
ing.200  This expression of public policy did not withstand scrutiny for
long.  Soon thereafter, Oregon amended its version of Rule 8.4 to au-
thorize any attorney—public or private—to direct clients or other per-
sons to engage in deception or misrepresentations “in the
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional
rights” so long as the attorney otherwise complies with the Model
Rules and has a good-faith belief that “unlawful activity has taken
place, is taking place or will take place in the foreseeable future.”201
Because of the complicated history of the attorney deception issue
in Oregon, the Oregon State Bar Association Board of Governors is-
sued an advisory opinion entitled Dishonesty and Misrepresentation:
Participation in Covert Investigations.202  In this opinion, the Oregon
Bar discussed three scenarios to test the interpretation and applica-
tion of the new investigation deception exception.  For the most part,
the Oregon Bar simply defined terms used in the new exception.  As
such, the opinion does not merit much discussion.  Notably, however,
the opinion makes clear that the scope of the investigation deception
exception does not include an attorney’s personal use of deception.203
To “preserve the fundamental tenet of the basic truthfulness of the
words spoken” by an attorney, the opinion concludes that the new
safe-harbor exception is intended only to permit an attorney to advise
198. See OR. REV. STAT. § 9.528 (2001).
199. Act of June 28, 2001, ch. 667, 2001 Or. Laws 1696, 1697.
200. OR. REV. STAT. § 9.528(2) (2001).
201. OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 8.4(b) (2009).
202. Or. State Bar, Formal Op. 2005-173 (2005), available at http://www.osbar.org/
_docs/ethics/2005-173.pdf.  This replaced Formal Op. 2003-173, which was de-
cided under the former Oregon Code of Professional Responsibility.  Or. State
Bar, Formal Ethics Opinion Library — Table of Contents, http://www.osbar.org/
ethics/toc.html (last visited July 19, 2010) (“In September 2005, the Board of Gov-
ernors approved the issuance of Formal Ethics Opinions 2005-1 through 2005-
175 to replace the previous Formal Ethics Opinions issued between 1991 and
2004.”)
203. Id. at 484.
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and supervise others in the use of deception in an investigation into
unlawful activity, not to participate directly in the deceptive
activity.204
Oregon’s full and open debate reached the perfect conclusion—at-
torneys should act honestly without deception, but investigators and
clients who lawfully employ deception to discover unlawful activity
should not be limited by attorney ethics rules.  Additionally, Oregon’s
express investigation deception exception provides the proper gui-
dance to attorneys who may wish to direct others to employ deception
to root out lawlessness.  Indeed, the ethical problem with Gatti’s posi-
tion—that he had the authority to employ deception for his client’s
case—really did not come down to deception in the broadest sense, but
whether an attorney may personally employ deception.  As implied
from the facts, the government attorneys who prompted Gatti’s decep-
tion did not personally engage in deception, but rather directed inves-
tigators to use deception to uncover unlawful activity.205  Courts have
long-accepted the necessity of allowing law enforcement to employ de-
ception to catch criminals.206  This practice apparently later convinced
Ositis that he could simply hire an investigator to employ deception to
discover unlawful activity.
Thus, the fighting issue was whether the Model Rules contain an
implied investigation deception exception—the Oregon Supreme
Court resoundingly and correctly answered no.  The next question, as
a matter of public policy, became whether the Model Rules should au-
thorize attorneys to personally engage in deception or at least not pro-
hibit attorneys from directing others to employ lawful deception.
Because no sound public policy cries out for attorneys to occupy that
role, the Model Rules should continue to prohibit attorney deception.
The Model Rules should be amended, however, to create an express
investigation deception exception that would allow attorneys to direct
non-attorneys to use lawful deception during investigations of unlaw-
ful activity.  The ABA should follow Oregon’s lead.  To assist in that
regard, I propose an express investigation deception exception in Part
VI below.
Gatti is not the only attorney who sought to use deception for the
benefit of his clients.  The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
addressed attorney deception in a case where an attorney used decep-
tion to try to remove a judge.207  Kevin P. Curry was an attorney in a
204. Id.
205. In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 969 (Or. 2000).
206. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557 (1977) (“Our cases, however,
have recognized the unfortunate necessity of undercover work and the value it
often is to effective law enforcement.”).
207. In re Curry, 880 N.E.2d 388, 388 (Mass. 2008).
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high-stakes civil case.208  After Judge Lopez entered an adverse deci-
sion in the case, Curry told his clients that Judge Lopez had “fixed”
the case against them,209 although Curry had no evidence indicating
that Judge Lopez was biased.210  Not surprisingly, Curry’s clients
were incensed by the possibility that they did not get a fair decision
after spending millions of dollars in legal fees, and they encouraged
Curry to investigate the judge’s bias to find evidence that could over-
turn the decision.211  Curry then began investigating Judge Lopez.212
During the investigation, Curry obtained the re´sume´ of Judge Lopez’s
former law clerk who had worked on the case.213  Curry and his pri-
vate investigator, Ernest Reid, then developed a ruse to try to gather
information about Judge Lopez’s decision making process in the
case.214  Curry and Reid met with the former law clerk several times
under the guise of interviewing him for a potential lucrative legal po-
sition, the clerk’s “dream job,” which actually did not exist.215  They
created a sham company and elaborate fake identities, and they even
paid for the former law clerk to fly to Halifax, Virginia, and New York
City for fake interviews.216  After Curry and Reid learned that the for-
mer law clerk had drafted the opinion in the case, they used the infor-
mation from these meetings to determine how the opinion had been
written and to discover damaging information about the judge.217
Appearing before the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Curry contested a recommendation by the Board of Bar Overseers
that he be disbarred as a result of his deception.218  Upholding disbar-
ment, the court found that Curry had violated a number of Massachu-
setts’s ethics rules equivalent to the Model Rules, including (1) Rule
8.4(c)’s prohibition against dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresen-
tation by his elaborate and deceptive scheme to obtain damaging in-
formation about Judge Lopez;219 (2) Rule 4.1(a)’s prohibition against
knowingly making a false statement of fact by his deceptive ruse cre-
ating a sham company with fake executives;220 (3) Rule 8.4(d)’s prohi-
bition against conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of
justice by trying to disqualify Judge Lopez from the case without hav-
208. Id. at 392–94.
209. Id. at 392, 395.
210. Id. at 395.
211. Id. at 394–95.
212. Id. at 395.
213. Id. at 395–96.
214. Id. at 396.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 396–400; In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 360–62 (Mass. 2008) (companion
case to Curry).
217. Id. at 396, 398–400.
218. Id. at 391.
219. Id. at 400–01, 403–05.
220. Id.
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ing any credible evidence that the judge was biased;221 (4) Rule
8.4(b)–(d)’s prohibition against conduct that adversely reflects on an
attorney’s fitness to practice law by his deception and utter disrespect
for the court;222 (5) Rule 1.2(d)’s prohibition against assisting a client
in conduct that is illegal or fraudulent by encouraging his clients to
authorize and fund multiple attempts to pressure the former law clerk
through dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation;223 and (6)
Rule 8.4(a)’s prohibition against circumventing the Model Rules
through enlisting another to do what the attorney is ethically prohib-
ited from doing himself—namely, employing an investigator to use de-
ception to gain information about Judge Lopez.224  Curry was not the
only attorney who had engaged in this unethical deception.  Another
attorney, Gary C. Crossen, joined in the deception, and he was also
disbarred.225
If Curry and Crossen would have had any reasonable basis for be-
lieving that the judge had engaged in unlawful activity, the issue of
whether an attorney can use deception to ferret out judicial lawless-
ness would have been more tenuous.  However, even if based upon a
reasonable belief of judicial unlawfulness, such a situation would still
not automatically insulate attorneys from ethical charges for using de-
ception, because the Model Rules contain no exceptions that allow the
behavior exhibited by Curry and Crossen.  Does mere suspicion of ju-
dicial wrongdoing warrant giving attorneys unilateral authority to in-
vestigate the wrongdoing through the use of deception?  The answer is
no.  It is better policy to continue to allow non-attorneys to employ
deception in investigations of wrongdoing, rather than granting that
authority to attorneys.  If lawful deception is the only tool that can
effectively discover unlawful activity, it would make little sense to pro-
hibit non-attorneys from employing such deception.  It also makes lit-
tle sense to apply rules governing the ethical conduct of attorneys to
non-attorneys who may otherwise lawfully employ deception to un-
cover unlawful activity.  The Model Rules should solely confront attor-
ney conduct that negatively impacts the legal profession, the judicial
system, and the rule of law.  If attorneys personally employ deception,
the slippery slope of lies, deceit, fraud, and misrepresentations will be
hard to stop.  If this deceptive conduct reinforces negative stereotypes
of attorneys as liars and cheats and encourages people to avoid attor-
neys, then the legal profession’s standing and ability to support our
judicial system and the rule of law will diminish.  Because there is no
pressing need for attorneys themselves to engage in deception, the
221. Id. at 405–07.
222. Id. at 407
223. Id. at 407–08.
224. Id. at 408.
225. In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352, 356–58 (Mass. 2008).
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Model Rules should continue to require the utmost honesty from mem-
bers of the bar, but leave well enough alone the lawful use of deception
by others if society deems that deception helpful to serve the greater
good.
The slippery slope underlying authorizing attorneys to personally
employ deception is marked by a few cases revealing that some attor-
neys believe they may ethically employ deception upon the court itself.
This behavior not only implicates the Model Rules, but it also brings
the system of justice into disrepute.  A Colorado prosecutor employed
deception as part of undercover investigations into drug trafficking by
filing a false criminal complaint and other documents with the court
and allowing a witness to make false statements in court.226  The Su-
preme Court of Colorado held that the prosecutor had violated Colo-
rado’s equivalent to Rule 8.4(c)–(d) by committing a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness
as a lawyer in other respects; engaging in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and engaging in conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice.227  Explaining that prose-
cutors “owe a very high duty to the public” and that their responsibil-
ity to enforce the laws does not authorize them to violate the Model
Rules, the court concluded that the prosecutor had acted unethically,
notwithstanding his “motives and the erroneous belief of other public
prosecutors that [his] conduct was ethical.”228  Again, once an implied
ends-justify-the-means deception exception is unleashed, it becomes
exceedingly difficult to put it back in the bottle.  It also becomes diffi-
cult to regulate attorney deception, because any attorney wishing to
employ deception would simply argue that the deception justifiably
serves the public.  The Model Rules would face an assault of excep-
tions.  These exceptions should only be rendered after a full and open
debate, and then drafted in the strictest terms possible to engender
faith and trust in attorneys.
In a similar case, the Review Board of the Illinois Attorney Regis-
tration and Disciplinary Commission likewise concluded that a prose-
cutor violated Illinois’s equivalent to Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition against
engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepre-
sentation by preparing and delivering a false document appearing to
be a court order in an effort to protect an abducted child.229  The Re-
view Board determined that drafting a phony court order constituted
unethical deception, and that the Rule’s prohibition of deception con-
226. People v. Reichman, 819 P.2d 1035, 1035–36 (Colo. 1991) (en banc).
227. Id. at 1035, 1038.
228. Id. at 1038–39.
229. Review Bd. of Ill. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm’n, Disciplinary Op.
No. 91 CH 348, at 1 (1994), 1994 WL 929289.
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tains no express or implied exceptions.230  However, the Review Board
was not unanimous in concluding that the prosecutor had violated
Rule 8.4(c).  Dissenting, three of the nine members concluded that the
prosecutor had not violated Rule 8.4(c) because the safety of a child
necessitated the deception.231  Indeed, the dissenting members char-
acterized the issue of attorney deception as “murky waters.”232
The waters surrounding the issue of attorney deception will be-
come far less murky if the ABA adopts an express investigation decep-
tion exception while keeping intact the bright-line rule prohibiting
attorneys from engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepre-
sentation.  However, if courts or disciplinary bodies choose to discover
and define implied deception exceptions on a case-by-case basis, the
waters will become even murkier.  To brighten the waters and clear
the murk, a large dose of sunlight should pour over the issue of attor-
ney deception in a full and open debate of the issue resulting in the
adoption of a narrowly tailored investigation deception exception.
From Gatti to Curry to Crossen, courts take a dim view of attorneys
using deception on a client’s behalf, especially because the Model
Rules contain no express deception exception.  Although numerous
friends of the court in Gatti petitioned for an interpretation of the
Model Rules that would include an implied deception exception, there
simply is no such exception.233  Even if a court were tempted to judi-
cially decree a deception exception—an invitation the Gatti court ex-
pressly declined—the scope and contours of such an exception
necessarily could only develop on a case-by-case basis after attorneys
unilaterally decided, at their own peril, to employ deception on a cli-
ent’s behalf.  As seen in the next section, sound public policy supports
society’s call for deception in certain investigations of wrongdoing.
However, no public policy supports making attorneys the source of de-
ception.  Ultimately, Oregon demonstrated the best approach to the
issue of attorney deception by conducting a full and open debate of the
issue.  This debate resulted in keeping intact the prohibition of attor-
ney deception while untethering from attorney ethics rules the lawful
use of deception by non-attorneys.234  Oregon’s shining example needs
to be replicated nationally.
230. Id. at 5.
231. Id. at 7–9.
232. Id. at 7–8 (citing In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333 (Ill. 1979)).
233. In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 968, 974–76 (Or. 2000).
234. The ABA’s Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility has
also addressed attorney deception on behalf of a client.  The Committee opined
that an attorney who records a conversation without the knowledge of the other
party to the conversation does not necessarily violate the Model Rules, even
though deception is required to hide the purpose of the conversation.  ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 01-422, at 1–5 (2001)
(withdrawing the contradictory Formal Op. 337 that concluded that attorneys
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C. I Didn’t Deceive, I Just Told Someone Else to Deceive:
Derivative Ethics Claims for Attorneys Directing
Other Persons to Engage in Deception
If an attorney may not personally engage in deception, should it be
ethical for an attorney to direct non-attorneys to lawfully employ de-
ception in their investigations of unlawful activity?  In an insightful
and influential law review article235 on attorney deception,236 David
B. Isbell, a former chairperson of the ABA Standing Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility,237 and Lucantonio N. Salvi ar-
gue that the Model Rules authorize attorneys to use “misrepresenta-
tions solely with regard to identity and purpose, and solely for
evidence-gathering purposes, by investigators and testers acting
under the direction of lawyers.”238  The Isbell–Salvi article promoted
an implied investigation deception exception which authorizes attor-
neys to direct non-attorney investigators239 to use deception to dis-
cover unlawful activity.  Although I agree that non-attorney
investigators should not be restrained from using lawful deception to
discover unlawful activity by a set of ethics rules that govern attorney
conduct, I disagree that the Model Rules impliedly authorize attorneys
may not ethically record conversations without informing all parties to the con-
versation).  The opinion also declared, however, that an attorney cannot record
conversations in violation of the law or misrepresent that the conversation is not
being recorded. Id. at 5–6.  Interestingly, the Committee refused to address the
festering issue of whether attorney deception is generally ethical:  “The Commit-
tee does not address . . . the application of the Model Rules to deceitful, but lawful
conduct by lawyers, either directly or through supervision of the activities of
agents and investigators, that often accompanies nonconsensual recording of con-
versations in investigations of criminal activity, discriminatory practices, and
trademark infringement.” Id. at 1–2.  Notwithstanding its reluctance to address
deception by attorneys or testers and investigators at an attorney’s direction, the
Committee favorably cited the Isbell and Salvi article, see infra notes 236–75 and
accompanying text, and the Apple Corps case, see infra notes 389–413 and accom-
panying text, both of which conclude that attorney deception is authorized when
conducting investigations into unlawful activity. Id. at 2 n.4.  The refusal to ad-
dress the thorny issue of attorney deception cries out for resolution.
235. I use the term “influential” in the sense that the article is frequently cited.  For
example, as of September 21, 2010, Westlaw reports that this article has been
cited eighty-nine times.  I use the term “insightful” in the sense that, as will be
seen in my analysis below, the article lends a great deal to the discussion of
whether the Model Rules authorize—or should authorize—the use of attorney
deception, particularly in investigations of unlawful conduct that can only be dis-
covered through the use of deception.
236. David B. Isbell & Lucantonio N. Salvi, Ethical Responsibility of Lawyers for De-
ception by Undercover Investigators and Discrimination Testers: An Analysis of
the Provisions Prohibiting Misrepresentation under the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 791 (1995).
237. Id. at 791 n.*.
238. Id. at 796.
239. By “non-attorney investigators,” I mean investigators who are not also acting in
the capacity of attorneys.
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to direct the deception due to the derivative nature of Rules 5.1, 5.2,
5.3, and 8.4(a).  Instead, the Model Rules must be amended to create
an express investigation deception exception to accommodate the good
that can come from an attorney directing the use of deception by non-
attorneys.
Isbell and Salvi primarily focus their attention on attorneys who
direct discrimination testers and undercover investigators to use de-
ception to uncover unlawful activity.240  The authors explain that dis-
crimination testers are valuable because they “detect and collect
evidence of discriminatory practices in employment, housing, public
accommodations and access to financing,” which, in turn, “assists in
dealing with employment discrimination [and other kinds of unlawful
discrimination] that would otherwise be undetected or unprovable.”241
The premise is that because attorneys routinely employ testers and
“investigators in a variety of situations as a means of ascertaining
facts, gathering evidence, and detecting unlawful behavior,” deception
often is required if the investigators are to be effective.242
Before addressing whether attorneys may ethically direct discrimi-
nation testers and undercover investigators to engage in deception, Is-
bell and Salvi first make the case that using testers and investigators
is socially desirable for four reasons.243  First, using testers and inves-
tigators serves society’s interest in enforcing the law by catching
wrongdoers.244  Second, testers and investigators often are the only
people who are able to effectively discover, and ultimately prove, viola-
tions of the law.245  To be useful, testers and investigators must con-
ceal their identity and true purpose.246  Third, because courts have
approved the use of testers and investigators, the only real drawback
to their use might be attorney ethics rules that prohibit attorney de-
ception or an attorney directing the use of deception by others.247
Fourth, public and private attorneys already widely employ testers
and investigators.248  The authors concluded that “there are circum-
stances where deception is justified in the search for truth” such “that
the scales of social policy tip markedly in favor of the use of under-
240. The authors use the term “undercover investigator” to mean an investigator who
disguises their identity or purpose in order to achieve their objective. Id. at
792–93.  The authors use the term “tester” to mean a person who poses as an
applicant for an opportunity open to the general public in order to detect more
invidious forms of discrimination. Id. at 793.  Examples of such a “tester” include
an applicant for housing, employment, or other similar opportunity. Id.
241. Id. at 796–97.
242. Id. at 800.
243. Id. at 801.
244. Id. at 801–02.
245. See id. at 802.
246. See id.
247. See id. at 799–800, 802–03.
248. Id. at 803.
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cover investigators and discrimination testers, despite the deceptions
necessarily entailed.”249  These are strong reasons supporting the law-
ful use of deception.
Isbell and Salvi next address whether government attorneys
should have more ethical leeway to employ deception to serve the pub-
lic good, and conclude that “there is no solid basis for a generalized
ethical distinction between government and private lawyers, exempt-
ing the former from applicable restrictions simply by reason of the
identity of their employer or client.”250  They contend that if someone
is violating the law, whether criminal or civil, the use of testers or
investigators to root out the lawlessness better serves societal inter-
ests than limiting the ethical use of deception to those employed by
the government.251  One would be hard-pressed to logically explain
why deception serves society only when employed by the government.
After setting the stage, Isbell and Salvi finally confront the ulti-
mate issue of whether attorneys’ use of deception through directing
testers and investigators to discover lawlessness violates Rules 4.1(a),
5.3(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(c).  The authors acknowledge that “practices that
have been longstanding and widespread with respect to undercover
investigators generally, and well established though more recent with
respect to discrimination testers in particular, appear on their face to
involve ethical violations on the part of lawyers directing the activities
of the investigators or testers.”252  Notwithstanding the appearance
that attorneys could not ethically employ deception, Isbell and Salvi
reach the following conclusions: (1) if an attorney acts in a non-repre-
sentational capacity as a tester or investigator, Rule 4.1(a)’s prohibi-
tion on making false statements of material facts to third persons
while representing a client would not apply because the attorney
would not be representing a client in those circumstances;253 (2) most
notably, Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition on “dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or mis-
representation would not apply to misrepresentations of the mild sort
necessarily made by discrimination testers and undercover investiga-
tors;”254 and (3) because Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) are not violated by
attorney deception, the derivative claims of vicarious liability for the
acts of others contained in Rules 5.3(c) and 8.4(a) do not apply because
the deception, if made by an attorney acting in a non-representational
capacity as a tester or investigator, would not violate the Model
Rules.255  Let’s explore the soundness of these conclusions.
249. Id. at 804.
250. Id. at 805.
251. See id. at 805–07.
252. Id. at 794.
253. See id. at 812–15.
254. Id. at 812 (emphasis added).
255. Id. at 812, 818–19.
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Isbell and Salvi correctly state that Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition on dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation is not limited to material
misrepresentations or when made in a representational capacity—the
prohibition applies to attorneys wherever they are and to whatever
they are doing.256  To conclude that attorneys’ use of deception when
acting as testers or investigators does not violate Rule 8.4(c), however,
the authors use an interpretive sleight-of-hand, stating that the rule
“applies only to conduct of so grave a character as to call into question
the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.”257  To reach this conclusion, the
authors quote comment 2 to Rule 8.4.258  This construction is unrea-
sonable for three reasons.  First, the plain language of comment 2
shows that its interpretation applies only to Rule 8.4(b), and not
8.4(c).  The comment’s first sentence states, “Many kinds of illegal con-
duct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law,” which tracks the
plain language of Rule 8.4(b) and in no way implicates Rule 8.4(c).259
The rest of the comment then explores the types of criminal offenses
that reflect adversely on an attorney’s fitness to practice law.  For ex-
ample, some crimes involve only matters of personal morality, and
when an attorney is answerable to the criminal law for those offenses,
no ethical violation should be found because those offenses “have no
specific connection to fitness for the practice of law.”260  Criminal of-
fenses that are connected to the fitness-to-practice-law question—
such that an attorney who commits those offenses should be profes-
sionally answerable for them—include fraud, the willful failure to file
a tax return, dishonesty, breach of trust, or a pattern of repeated of-
fenses.261  It would be entirely redundant to include fraud and dishon-
esty under both Rules 8.4(b) and 8.4(c).  A better interpretation is that
the Model Rules really do not countenance dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation by attorneys.  Encouraging attorneys to lie, de-
fraud, deceive, and misrepresent is poor public policy.
The second problem is that such an interpretation necessarily con-
cludes that attorneys may freely and unilaterally decide to lie, de-
fraud, deceive, and misrepresent, so long as the attorney feels that her
fitness to practice law will not be jeopardized.  I suspect that every
attorney in every case involving attorney deception would seek such a
liberal interpretation while arguing that the deception served a
greater good.  Instead of discovering a murky, ill-defined implied in-
vestigation deception exception, it would be prudent to adopt an ex-
press deception exception instead.
256. Id. at 816.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 816 n.90.
259. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2 (2007).
260. Id.
261. Id.
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Third, and most importantly, interpreting Rule 8.4(c) to apply only
to cases implicating an attorney’s fitness to practice law—and neces-
sarily excluding from that realm the use of deception in investigator
and tester cases—does not involve any analysis.  Instead, this implied
exception simply transforms the question—whether attorney decep-
tion impacts an attorney’s fitness to practice law—into a conclusion
that attorney deception does not impact an attorney’s fitness to prac-
tice law when done in a non-representational capacity while acting as
a tester or investigator to uncover lawlessness.  The ultimate question
simply becomes the ultimate conclusion.  The root of Rule 8.4(c)’s pro-
hibition seems to rest on the idea that attorneys should not be liars
and cheats.262  To resolve this issue, the legal profession owes it to
society to clearly articulate—after a full and informed debate—if and
when attorneys may ethically employ deception.  Simply concluding
that attorney deception, when employed in certain circumstances,
does not impact an attorney’s fitness to practice law puts the cart
before the horse.  If a full and informed debate reaches that conclu-
sion, then the Model Rules should be amended to reflect that senti-
ment, creating an express deception exception.
Notwithstanding their conclusion that attorneys may direct the
use of deception by testers and investigators without violating Rules
4.1(a), 5.3(c), 8.4(a), or 8.4(c), Isbell and Salvi caution that the ethical
availability of deception is limited.263  The first exclusion from their
implied deception exception is that an attorney cannot ethically direct
a tester or investigator to engage in fraud or perjury.264  The authors
reason that because an attorney cannot directly engage in fraud or
perjury, then the attorney cannot direct others to do so.  Unfortu-
nately, this analysis contradicts, or at least falls short of, their inter-
pretation of Rule 8.4(c) to include only conduct that impacts an
attorney’s fitness to practice law.  The authors simply draw an ethical
distinction between mere dishonesty, deceit, or misrepresentation,
and fraud or perjury.265  Without further analysis, however, their con-
clusion becomes nothing more than a premise.  That is, if an attorney
may unilaterally decide to lie and deceive, why is that same attorney
prohibited from engaging in fraud or perjury if needed to uncover un-
lawful activity?  Thus, an implied investigation exception to attorney
deception simply confounds the scope of that exception.  Such an ex-
262. Undeniably, certain lies and deceptions seem commonplace in our society.  Many
parents are routinely challenged by their children on whether lying can be justi-
fied—is there a Santa Claus, a Tooth Fairy, or an Easter Bunny?  Do babies come
from storks?  If an attorney lied in response to these questions, those lies would
not impact an attorney’s fitness to practice law.  This is not the essence of the
attorney deception issue.
263. See Isbell & Salvi, supra note 236, at 820–29.
264. Id. at 821.
265. See id.
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ception is not a solution.  The solution is to create an express exception
after a full and fair debate, which Isbell and Salvi have undoubtedly
assisted.
The second exclusion from their implied deception exception makes
it unethical for an attorney to use deception if it violates Rule 4.2’s
prohibition against communicating with persons represented by coun-
sel and Rule 4.4’s prohibition against violating the rights of third per-
sons while obtaining evidence.266  These are troubling conclusions.
Isbell and Salvi employ a bright-line interpretation of Rules 4.2 and
4.4 that carves litigation practices out of the deception exception:
[T]his may mean that [attorneys] may make use of testers only in investigat-
ing whether a particular enterprise is engaging in discriminatory practices,
and in preparing litigation challenging such practices, but not in gathering
further evidence once the litigation has been commenced or announced, and
the target of litigation has made known that it is represented by counsel in
the matter.267
In support of their position, the authors cite a couple of court decisions
and ABA opinions which conclude that attorneys cannot ethically use
investigators to do what attorneys cannot do—namely, communicate
with opposing parties represented by counsel.268  Unfortunately,
these conclusions again demonstrate the difficulty in setting the scope
of the deception exception when the exception is implied through in-
terpretation.  It is more prudent and efficient to carve out an express
deception exception such that the public policy reasons are fully vetted
and included in the exception.  If a full and open debate on attorney
deception results in a consensus that deception in litigation should be
unethical, while deception occurring pre-litigation is ethical, then so
be it.  However, such a distinction appears illogical.  So long as an at-
torney does not engage in the deception—whether pre-litigation or
during litigation—then the ethics rules should not hinder a client or
third person from lawfully employing deception to root out lawless-
ness regardless of whether the unlawful activity takes place before,
during, or after litigation is underway.  Analysis of an express investi-
gation deception exception reveals the contours of the exception.
Isbell and Salvi correctly analyze the applicability of Rule 4.3’s re-
striction on how an attorney may ethically deal with unrepresented
266. Id. at 822.
267. Id. at 823.
268. Id. at 824 (citing United States v. Hammad, 678 F. Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(holding that prosecutors violated ethics rules where government agents recorded
telephone conversations between defendant and witness and where prosecutor
knew at the time that defendant had retained counsel); Monsanto Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 593 A.2d 1013 (Del. 1990) (concluding that an attorney who used
investigators to interview former employees of claimant without determining
whether they were represented by counsel violated Rules 4.2 and 4.3); ABA
Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Informal Op. 663 (1967) (asserting that
an attorney cannot communicate through a private investigator)).
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persons through the use of deception by testers and investigators.269
The authors accurately explain that Rule 4.3 involves a third person’s
presumed expectations in dealing with an attorney for an opposing
party.270  Thus, an attorney acting in a representational capacity, “but
disguising his identity as such in dealing with an unrepresented per-
son can also violate Rule 4.3 because, although he is acting as a[n at-
torney], he has allowed [the third] person to misunderstand that
fact.”271  Because Rule 4.3 only deals with the presumed expectations
of third persons when dealing directly with attorneys, however, it
should not apply vicariously to an attorney who supervises testers and
investigators who employ deception, especially if the tester or investi-
gator is the attorney’s client.272  The authors conclude bluntly and cor-
rectly: “No unrepresented person is realistically likely to apply his or
her expectations of [attorneys] to an investigator or tester.”273
Finally, Isbell and Salvi address Rule 4.4’s prohibition against ob-
taining evidence in ways that violate the rights of third persons.274
They argue that it should remain unethical for an attorney to direct or
supervise testers or investigators who violate the legal rights of others
through unreasonable searches and seizures, entrapment, invasion of
privacy, or unlawful wiretapping.275  This sound conclusion lies in un-
derstanding that an attorney’s proper role is to help others comply
with, rather than violate, the law.  If a deception exception—whether
implied or express—allows attorneys to direct testers or investigators
to use deception to uncover unlawful activity, it would not make sense
to allow unlawful activity to root out unlawful activity.  Indeed, two
wrongs would not make a right.  To be sure, Rule 1.2(d) already pro-
hibits an attorney from assisting in the violation of the law.  It would
be sheer folly to make an exception to that rule to allow lawlessness
under the guise of investigating lawlessness.
With the benefit of the sound starting position provided by the ana-
lytical framework described in Part III and the Isbell–Salvi article
summarized in section IV.C above, it is important to see how courts
have confronted attorney deception on a client’s behalf.  New York
courts considered a disciplinary case against a state-employed attor-
ney who directed a state employee to lie under oath to help catch other
state employees suspected of criminal activity.  Brian Malone, an at-
torney serving as Inspector General of the New York State Depart-
ment of Correctional Services, led an investigation into allegations
269. See id. at 825.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 826.
275. Id. at 827.
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that corrections officers broke the law by brutally beating an in-
mate.276  When a corrections officer (CO) came forward to identify the
officers involved in the beating, Malone decided that the CO would be
subjected to retaliation by his peers for violating the “code of silence”
that prohibits corrections officers from reporting on other corrections
officers.277  Malone sought a way to root out the culpable officers while
keeping the CO’s identity a secret to avoid retribution to the CO for
breaking the code of silence.278  To accomplish this goal, Malone di-
rected the CO to lie under oath when interviewed alongside the al-
leged offenders.279  Although the CO lied under oath to hide his
identity, Malone had previously interviewed the CO under oath to
capture his honest testimony.280  After unilaterally conducting this
ruse, Malone informed the Commissioner of the Department of Cor-
rectional Services and its chief legal counsel about the CO’s contradic-
tory sworn testimony.281  Both officials approved of Malone’s use of
deception.282  After disciplinary charges were brought against the sus-
pected officers for using undue force, the CO was forced to identify
himself and his contradictory sworn testimony.283  Malone’s deception
resulted in additional disciplinary charges, but these were not charges
against the offending corrections officers.  Instead, these were charges
that Malone had acted unethically as an attorney in directing the
deception.
Based on Malone’s instructing the CO to lie under oath, New
York’s Committee on Professional Standards brought disciplinary
charges against Malone for violating New York’s equivalent to Rule
8.4(b)–(c) by engaging in “illegal conduct involving moral turpitude,”
“conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law,” and
“conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.”284
A referee issued a bright-line finding that Malone had engaged “in
conduct involving deceit and misrepresentation,” noting that Malone’s
justifications for his deception were irrelevant in deciding whether the
deception was unethical.285
The question of whether Malone acted ethically in directing the CO
to engage in deception by lying under oath split the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court.  In a 3–2 decision, the court held that
276. In re Malone, 480 N.Y.S.2d 603, 604 (1984).
277. See id.
278. Id.
279. Id. at 605.
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
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Malone had violated the ethics rules.286  The court made clear that
the deception prohibition does not contain an implied ends-justify-the-
means exception.287  The court explained that the reason for an attor-
ney’s unilateral deception does not transform the conduct into ethical
behavior, particularly when there are alternatives to the use of decep-
tion.288  In no uncertain terms, the court issued a bright-line interpre-
tation of the ethics rules by holding that there are no implied
exceptions that allow attorneys to engage in conduct involving dishon-
esty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.289  In other words, the court
rejected an implied investigation deception exception.
In a dissenting opinion, two justices concluded that not only did
Malone act ethically, but he acted admirably to improve the adminis-
tration of justice.290  The dissent applauded Malone’s deception in ad-
vancing the public interest by rooting out a conspiracy among corrupt
corrections officers to mistreat inmates, noting that Malone’s decep-
tion “has not diminished the court’s integrity one iota.”291  Borrowing
freely from criminal cases admitting evidence obtained through decep-
tion, the dissenting opinion concluded that “carefully selected use of
[attorney] deception in compelling circumstances” should be sanc-
tioned as supporting the administration of justice and “legitimate law
enforcement objectives.”292  Indeed, the dissenting opinion dignified
the ends-justify-the-means defense, explaining that Malone’s decep-
tion caused no harm to the judicial system or society, protected inno-
cent people, rooted out corrupt officials, revealed truth, and advanced
the public interest.293  It concluded that “compelling circumstances”
justified Malone’s deception.”294  Finally, the dissent cautioned that if
attorneys were not authorized to unilaterally decide to engage in de-
ception, “the practical but unwholesome effect . . . may well be the
cessation of meaningful investigations of corrupt conduct by similarly
engaged lawyers, prosecutors and judges.”295
286. Id. at 607.  The court initially rejected Malone’s contention that he was not acting
as an attorney while engaging in deception:
Holding a public office, such as Inspector General, is not a shield behind
which breaches of professional ethics, otherwise warranting disciplinary
action, are permitted.  Rather, a lawyer who holds public office must not
only fulfill the duties and responsibilities of that office, but must also
comply with the Bar’s ethical standards.
Id. at 606.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 606–07.
289. Id. at 607.
290. Id. at 608–09 (Yesawich, J., dissenting).
291. Id. at 608.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 608–09.
295. Id. at 609.
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A few years before Malone was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court
issued one of the first decisions addressing the issue of whether attor-
neys may ethically engage in deception by instructing witnesses to lie
in court.296  While serving in the Cook County State’s Attorney’s Of-
fice as Chief of the Criminal Division, Morton Friedman directed wit-
nesses to lie in court to help catch attorneys who bribed witnesses.297
In one instance, Friedman instructed a police officer to follow the di-
rections of an attorney who sought to bribe the officer to secure the
dismissal of a criminal charge against the attorney’s client.298  Follow-
ing Friedman’s instructions, the officer lied in court, resulting in the
dismissal of the criminal charges.299  After the criminal charges were
dismissed and the attorney paid the bribe to the officer, the State At-
torney’s Office indicted the attorney for bribery.300  The State Attor-
ney’s Office then informed the court of its plan to have the officer lie in
court to catch the bribing attorney.301  In another instance, Friedman
instructed a police officer to lie in court to aid the dismissal of criminal
battery charges against an attorney’s client in exchange for a bribe.302
After the officer’s false in-court testimony resulted in the charges be-
ing dropped, the bribing attorney paid the lying officer.303  The State
Attorney’s Office informed the court of the officer’s lies immediately
after the dismissal of the criminal charges, which were later
reinstated.304
This straightforward use of deception confounded the Illinois At-
torney Registration and Disciplinary Commission.  The Commission’s
Administrator brought ethical charges against Friedman for soliciting
false testimony in court to catch bribing attorneys.305  The Adminis-
trator claimed that Friedman violated Illinois’s equivalents to Rules
3.3, 3.4, and 8.4(c) by creating false evidence, knowingly using false
evidence, secreting a witness, and engaging in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.306  However, the Com-
mission’s Hearing Board decided that Friedman’s deception had not
violated any ethics rules.307  The Administrator sought review of that
decision by the Commission’s nine-member Review Board.308  Upon
initial review by five members, three board members recommended
296. In re Friedman, 392 N.E.2d 1333, 1334 (Ill. 1979).
297. Id. at 1333–34.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1334.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 1333.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
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that Friedman be censured for his unethical misconduct, while two
members recommended affirming the Hearing Board’s decision that
Friedman had not violated any ethics rules.309  Following a second re-
view, however, a five-member majority recommended that Friedman
be censured for his ethical violations, while three members
dissented.310
The disciplinary case found its way to the Illinois Supreme Court,
where unanimity was also elusive.311  The deception issue fractured
the court, with four of the six participating justices writing separately.
Ultimately, the court decided to dismiss the ethical charges against
Friedman.312  To reach that result, however, even the four-justice ma-
jority split, with two justices deciding that Friedman had violated the
ethics rules313 and two justices deciding that Friedman had not vio-
lated the ethics rules.314  Two justices issued dissenting opinions,
voicing their disapproval of dismissing the ethical charges against
Friedman.315  In total, four justices concluded that Friedman had ac-
ted unethically, but four also decided that Friedman should not be dis-
ciplined for his deception.
Friedman’s argument, at its core, was that he did not act unethi-
cally because his deceptive investigative methods, like “court-toler-
ated deceit employed in narcotics investigations,” were necessary to
catch corrupt attorneys.316  Friedman contended that his “lofty motive
negate[d] any technical violation” of the ethics rules.317  The Adminis-
trator, on the other hand, argued that attorneys do not have unilateral
discretion to employ “deceit and deception . . . to mislead or deceive a
court.”318  The Administrator further argued that an attorney’s mo-
tive to engage in deception does not shield the attorney from his ethi-
cal responsibility to be honest.319
In a 4–2 decision, the court held “that no sanction should be im-
posed” against Friedman, because he had “acted without the guidance
of precedent or settled opinion and because there is apparently consid-
erable belief (as evidenced by the letters and affidavit supporting
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 1336.
313. Id. at 1333–36 (Goldenhersh, C.J., delivering the court’s decision, with Kluczyn-
ski, J., joining the decision and opinion).
314. Id. at 1336–39 (Underwood, J., concurring) (Ryan, J., joined the concurring opin-
ion, also finding no ethical violation and agreeing with the decision not to disci-
pline Friedman).
315. Id. at 1339–42 (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 1342–43 (Moran, J., dissenting).
316. Id. at 1334.
317. Id. at 1334–35.
318. Id. at 1335.
319. Id.
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[him]) that he acted properly in conducting the investigations.”320
Yet, the justices were far from unanimous in their approaches to the
case.
The first of the four opinions, written by Chief Justice Goldenhersh
and announcing the opinion of the court, concluded that Friedman had
violated his ethical duties but decided that discipline was not war-
ranted.321  Chief Justice Goldenhersh stated that it was “apparent”
that Friedman had “deviated” from the rules prohibiting an attorney
from creating and using false evidence, secreting a witness, and en-
gaging in conduct involving dishonesty and deception.322  Although
Friedman maintained that his argument was not “that the end justi-
fies the means,” Chief Justice Goldenhersh thought otherwise and
found Friedman’s argument unacceptable because “[t]he integrity of
the courtroom is so vital to the health of our legal system that no vio-
lation of that integrity, no matter what its motivation, can be con-
doned or ignored.”323  Taking aim at Friedman’s “contention that no
alternative methods were available to ensure the successful prosecu-
tion of corrupt attorneys,” Chief Justice Goldenhersh wrote that “even
if no other ways existed to ferret out bribery, [Friedman] would still
not be privileged to engage in unethical (and perhaps illegal) con-
duct.”324  Chief Justice Goldenhersh rejected the notion that the
Model Rules contained an implied investigation deception
exception.325
Agreeing that Friedman should receive no discipline, the other two
justices—rounding out the four-justice majority dismissing the ethical
charges against Friedman—concluded that Friedman had not violated
his ethical duties in the least.326  Justice Underwood, who penned a
concurring opinion, recited a long list of supporters who concluded
that Friedman had not violated any ethics rules by engaging in decep-
tion.327  Justice Underwood cited and quoted at length legal authori-
ties such as the Chief of the Criminal Justice Division of the Illinois
Attorney General’s Office, federal and state judges, federal and state
prosecutors, the Governor of Illinois, law school professors, and crimi-
nal defense attorneys.328  One ethics expert testified that Friedman
did not violate any ethics rules because his deception was rooted in a
pure motive, one that sought “to improve the administration of crimi-
320. Id. at 1336.
321. Id. at 1333–36.
322. Id. at 1335.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 1336.
325. See id. at 1335 (stating that Friedman had violated ethics rules without examin-
ing whether exceptions applied).
326. Id. at 1336–39 (Underwood, J., concurring).
327. Id. at 1336.
328. Id.
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nal justice.”329  Indeed, Justice Underwood did more than simply con-
clude that Friedman had not violated any ethics rules.  He applauded
Friedman’s conduct to independently engage in deception in court pro-
ceedings:  “[T]here is no doubt [that Friedman] believed his own con-
duct necessary to avoid a greater injury—the continued corruption of
the judicial process by the two attorneys.  That belief was, in my judg-
ment, not only reasonable—it was correct.”330  Finally, although Jus-
tice Underwood casually mentioned that he “abhor[s] the thought of
intentionally deceiving a judge—even temporarily—by the presenta-
tion of false testimony,” he also explained that he “abhor[s] even more
those members of my profession who seek to prostitute our courts” by
bribing witnesses.331  Because Friedman “was a conscientious prose-
cutor dedicated to improving the administration of criminal justice”
through the use of deception, Justice Underwood voted to dismiss the
ethical charges against him.332  Justice Underwood unquestionably
viewed Friedman as an ethics hero, not an unethical villain.
Two justices did not share Justice Underwood’s unbridled and en-
thusiastic praise for Friedman’s conduct.  Justice Clark was unforgiv-
ing and blunt in his assessment:
Lawyers who cause or permit lies to be told to judges are guilty of conduct
which tends to defeat the administration of justice, regardless of the motive of
the lawyer and regardless of the immediate impact of the lie.  That [Fried-
man’s] sole apparent motive was to obtain evidence which he considered es-
sential to the effective prosecution of corrupt attorneys therefore is not
dispositive . . .  It is not within the province of any attorney, including one who
represents the State, to determine whether the public interest requires the
temporary deception of the court. . . .  At the very least, therefore, I find
[Friedman] guilty of incredibly poor ethical judgment and deserving of
censure.333
Evincing an understanding of the difficulty in prosecuting corrupt at-
torneys without actually allowing them to engage in bribery of police
officers, Justice Clark nonetheless condemned Friedman’s decision “to
confront the court, after the fact, with the completed deception, stat-
ing in effect: ‘I did it.  I’m proud of it.  What are you going to do about
it?’”334  In the final calculation, Justice Clark concluded that Fried-
man’s intentional deception of the courts could not withstand ethical
scrutiny and decided that Friedman had unethically “usurped the role
of the courts through deceiving a trial judge.”335
329. Id. at 1336–37 (referencing STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION
AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 1.4 (1971)).
330. Id. at 1339.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1340 (Clark, J., dissenting).
334. Id. at 1341.
335. Id. at 1342.
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In the final written opinion, Justice Moran declared that he was
“diametrically opposed” to Justice Underwood’s opinion because it “not
only condones [Friedman]’s conduct but also lauds him for it and en-
courages it in others,” all under the inescapable conclusion “that the
end justifies the means.”336  Such a conclusion, according to Justice
Moran, “sets an intolerably dangerous precedent.”337  Condemning
Friedman’s behavior, Justice Moran stressed the important role of at-
torney ethics in our legal system:
[Friedman’s] conduct is of the genre which has undermined the public’s
confidence in the profession, in the courts and, ultimately, in the law. If the
public finds it intolerable that a member of the profession can operate without
the constraints of law, it can be no less intolerable to the court affronted by
the conduct.  The court must remain the ultimate forum of truth.  [Fried-
man’s] conduct has disregarded that essential, and, in so critical a considera-
tion, I do not believe that the court can condemn the act but excuse the
actor.338
In no uncertain terms, Justice Moran rejected the “pure motive”
defense:
[T]he public, the court and the profession have the right, minimally, to expect
a valid, common-sense determination by the practitioner to discern right from
wrong, and one need not be trained in the law to know that it is flatly unac-
ceptable to prevaricate to or mislead the court or to be instrumental in encour-
aging others to do so.339
Justice Moran’s bright-line approach holds attorneys to the highest
ethical standards of truthfulness and honesty to maintain the public’s
trust in the legal profession.
The Philadelphia Bar Association’s Professional Guidance Com-
mittee addressed attorney deception by issuing an advisory opinion on
whether an attorney who is representing a client in litigation may
336. Id. at 1342–43 (Moran, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 1342.
338. Id. at 1343.  This opinion reminds me of Justice Brandeis’s cautionary tale in his
famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States:
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that government officials
shall be subjected to the same rules of conduct that are commands to the
citizen.  In a government of laws, existence of the government will be
imperiled if it fails to observe the law scrupulously.  Our government is
the potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the
whole people by its example.  Crime is contagious.  If the government
becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to
become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy.  To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means—to de-
clare that the government may commit crimes in order to secure the con-
viction of a private criminal—would bring terrible retribution.  Against
that pernicious doctrine this court should resolutely set its face.
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see
also Attorney Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Garcia, 979 A.2d 146, 154 (Md. 2009)
(“We have recognized that public confidence in the legal profession is a critical
facet to the proper administration of justice.”).
339. Friedman, 392 N.E.2d at 1342.
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ethically direct a third person to use deception to gain access as a
“friend” to the MySpace or Facebook pages of an unrepresented, ad-
verse, non-party witness who the attorney had deposed in the case.340
The attorney wanted to gather information from the witness’s social
networking pages that could be used to impeach the witness’s testi-
mony.341  Although the attorney did not want the investigator to lie to
the witness to gain access to the websites, the attorney wanted to con-
ceal the investigator’s true identity and purpose by hiding his affilia-
tion with the attorney and “the true purpose for which [the
investigator sought] access, namely, to provide the information posted
on the pages to a lawyer for possible use antagonistic to the
witness.”342
The Committee deflected the question of whether the attorney
could use a non-attorney third person to avoid ethical issues.  Citing
Pennsylvania’s equivalents to Rules 5.3(c)(1) and 8.4(a), the Commit-
tee found that the attorney was ethically responsible for the conduct of
the third person as though the attorney were engaging in that behav-
ior himself.343  Thus, the ultimate question of whether an attorney
may ethically engage in deception had to be resolved on the merits,
regardless of whether the attorney engaged in the deception or di-
rected a third person to do so.344
The Committee concluded that the deception was unethical for two
reasons.345  First, the Committee decided that the conduct would vio-
late Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition on conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation, because the purpose of the conduct was
to deceptively induce the witness to allow access to her websites with-
out disclosing that the true purpose for the access was to obtain im-
peachable information.346  In bright-line fashion the Committee
declared, “Deception is deception.”347  The second reason for deeming
the conduct unethical was that it would violate Rule 4.1(a)’s prohibi-
tion that attorneys, while representing clients, cannot make false
statements of material facts to third persons.348
In providing clear-cut guidance that an attorney’s use of deception
is unethical, the Committee realized that it was not providing its opin-
ion in a vacuum.  Indeed, the Committee made clear that it was
“aware that there is controversy regarding the ethical propriety of a
lawyer engaging in certain kinds of investigative conduct that might
340. Philadelphia Bar Ass’n Prof’l Guidance Comm., Op. 2009-02 (2009).
341. Id. at 1.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 2–3.
344. Id. at 3–6.
345. Id. at 3–4.
346. Id. at 3.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 4.
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be thought to be deceitful.”349  Specifically, the Committee referenced
various positions on the issue of attorney deception.350  First, the
Committee noted that the New York Lawyers’ Association Committee
on Professional Ethics had “approved the use of deception, but limited
such use to investigation of civil right or intellectual property right
violations where the lawyer believes a violation is taking place or is
imminent, other means are not available to obtain evidence and rights
of third parties are not violated.”351  Second, the Committee acknowl-
edged that two state supreme courts—Colorado and Oregon—applied
bright-line interpretations to conclude that the Model Rules did not
contain implied exceptions for attorney deception.352  Finally, the
Committee commented that two states—Oregon and Iowa—have ex-
plicitly carved out exceptions to their Model Rules to allow attorneys
to engage in deception in limited circumstances.353
The issues confronted by the courts in Malone and Friedman and
by the Philadelphia Bar contain no easy solution for a democratic soci-
ety that demands fairness in its judicial system.  On the one hand,
authorizing dishonesty and deception by attorneys to root out dishon-
esty and deception within that system may not engender public trust
and confidence.354  On the other hand, allowing unlawful activity to go
unchecked because of attorney ethics rules is not appealing.355  Some
participants in the debate have obviously concluded that the deception
employed by Malone and Friedman was required to expose evil.  Per-
haps lying beneath the surface in both cases is the sentiment that al-
ternatives existed to the attorney’s unilateral choice to use deception
349. Id.
350. Id. at 4–6.
351. Id. at 4 (citing N.Y. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 737
(2007)).
352. Id. at 5–6 (citing People v. Pautler, 47 P.3d 1175 (Colo. 2002); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d
966 (Or. 2000)).
353. Id. (citing OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2009); IOWA RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2005)).
354. See, e.g., Midwest Motor Sports v. Arctic Cat Sales, Inc., 347 F.3d 693, 694–96,
699–700 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding that attorneys violated Rule 8.4(c) by directing
an investigator to use deception to interview the opposing party “under false and
misleading pretenses” by posing as a customer to acquire information for ongoing
litigation concerning a franchise dispute, particularly because that “information
that could have been obtained properly through the use of formal discovery tech-
niques” without “resorting to self-help remedies that violate the ethical rules”).
355. See, e.g., Hill v. Shell Oil Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 876, 880 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding
that an attorney’s use of testers before and after the filing of a race discrimina-
tion class action to obtain videotape evidence of discrimination did not violate
Rules 4.2 and 4.3 because, although attorneys and their investigators “cannot
trick protected employees into doing things or saying things they otherwise
would not do or say,” attorneys “can employ persons to play the role of customers
seeking services on the same basis as the general public” and “can videotape pro-
tected employees going about their activities in what those employees believe is
the normal course”).
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to uncover unlawful activity.  If there are alternative ways to uncover
unlawful activity, then the debate should be tamped down, and not
authorizing an attorney to employ deception might be palatable to
both sides.  For example, it was implied in the Philadelphia Bar’s
opinion that if the witness’s Facebook or MySpace pages contained in-
formation that contradicted her sworn testimony and that information
could not be obtained through other means, then a party to a lawsuit
would have no way of countering false testimony.  It seems apparent,
however, that the attorney could have employed judicial measures to
obtain the information without resorting to deception.  But if there
were no alternatives to capturing the information to impeach the wit-
ness’s sworn testimony other than through the otherwise lawful de-
ception by a non-attorney third person, then it seems to be bad policy
to use attorney ethics rules to forbid a non-attorney from doing some-
thing that no other law prohibits.  If indeed there are no alternatives,
however, such that the unlawful actors will go undetected and unpun-
ished without attorney deception, then perhaps there is a perfect
stalemate—requiring a choice between two evils.  This is the real ful-
crum of the attorney deception debate.
Society is listening for our answer as to the scope of any deception
exception.  My express investigation deception exception defines the
scope and governs the types of scenarios found in Malone, Friedman,
and before the Philadelphia Bar in a reasonable manner.  To ensure
that the legal profession carries the banner of utmost honesty to foster
trust and support for the administration of justice and the rule of law,
I agree with the court in Malone and four of the justices in Friedman
who condemned attorney deception.  Once attorneys use the legal pro-
fession and the courts as breeding grounds for deception, the search
for truth is ultimately undermined.  And, the slippery slope of an
ends-justify-the-means exception leads to further mistrust.  This cycle
of deeper distrust of the legal profession and the justice system would
risk spinning downward rather than upward.  In a phrase, the public
should be conditioned to believe that attorneys are honest and fair
rather than dishonest and deceptive.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin, on the other hand, authorized
the use of deception by an attorney.  In Office of Lawyer Regulation v.
Hurley,356 an attorney named Stephen Hurley was accused of violat-
ing the Wisconsin equivalents to Rules 4.1(a) and 8.4(c) by making a
false statement of material fact and employing deception when he
hired an investigator to help a criminal defendant’s case.357  Hurley
represented a criminal defendant in a case alleging, among other
356. Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Stephen P. Hurley, No. 2007AP478-D (Wis. Feb.
11, 2009), available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s69NewsDocumentOrder/
FileUpload500/6211/Office%20of%20Lawyer%20Regulation%20v.%20Hurley.pdf.
357. Id. at 2–3.
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things, the possession of child pornography and exposing a child to
those harmful materials.358  Believing that the alleged victim was ly-
ing, Hurley hired an investigator to use deception to obtain the vic-
tim’s personal computer to show that the victim freely viewed
pornography.359  Using the ruse of an owner of a computer company
who was giving away free computers, the investigator was able to ob-
tain the suspect’s computer, which contained pornography.360  Re-
sponding to the resulting ethics charges, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court concluded that Hurley had not violated any ethics rules—deriv-
ative or otherwise—because an implied deception exception existed in
Wisconsin.361  The court quoted the ethics referee to show that “there
was a widespread belief in the Wisconsin Bar that the type of conduct
engaged in by Attorney Hurley was and is acceptable.”362  The court
noted that “prosecutors frequently supervise a variety of undercover
activities and sting operations carried out by nonlawyers who use de-
ception to collect evidence, including misrepresentations as to identity
and purpose.”363  Explaining that there is no authority for the proposi-
tion that prosecutors can employ deception while private attorneys
cannot, the court dismissed the ethics charges against Hurley.364
Although I disagree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s discovery
of an implied deception exception in the Model Rules, I agree with the
court that certain undercover operations require deception to expose
lawlessness.  Almost all of the cases discussed so far demonstrate that
it can be exceedingly difficult for evidence of wrongdoing to be discov-
ered without some sort of undercover operation that necessarily em-
ploys a form of deception.  From undercover criminal investigations to
discrimination testers to enforcers of intellectual property rights, de-
ception is often needed to discover unlawful activity.  Courts have long
approved and repeatedly sanctioned the use of deception by testers in
discrimination cases.365  As alluded to above, testers disguise their
true purpose and identity—whether to secure housing, apply for a job,
or seek to use goods or services—to collect evidence of unlawful prac-
tices of discrimination based on such classifications as race, gender, or
disability.366  The use of testers is arguably required because it is
358. Id. at 2.
359. Id.
360. Id. at 2–3.
361. Id. at 3–4.
362. Id. at 4.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. See, e.g., Richardson v. Howard, 712 F.2d 319, 321 (7th Cir. 1983); Wharton v.
Knefel, 562 F.2d 550, 554 n.18 (8th Cir. 1977).
366. See generally Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373 (1982) (examin-
ing whether persons posing as “testers” had standing to sue under the Fair Hous-
ing Act).
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often difficult, and perhaps inefficient or impossible, to uncover inten-
tional discrimination by waiting for victims to be identified.367  In-
deed, employing deception in these situations seems justified,
beacause the effects of discrimination are not felt by actual victims.
This idea is not unlike investigators’ use of deception to catch online
pedophiles—society has determined that it is better to catch the
pedophile before there is a damaged victim.  Indeed, the evidence of
discrimination that testers provide is often more than simply useful—
it is invaluable and indispensable.  The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit has explained that, although it is “re-
grettable that [housing] testers must mislead commercial landlords
and home owners as to their real intentions to rent or buy housing,”
the practical “requirement of deception [is] a relatively small price to
pay to defeat racial discrimination.  The evidence provided by testers
both benefits unbiased landlords by quickly dispelling false claims of
discrimination and is a major resource in society’s continuing struggle
to eliminate the subtle but deadly poison of racial discrimination.”368
Monroe H. Freedman has “concluded that there are circumstances
in which a lawyer can ethically make a false statement of fact to a
tribunal [in violation of Rule 3.3(a)(1)], can ethically make a false
statement of material fact to a third person [in violation of Rule
4.1(a)], and can ethically engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation [in violation of Rule 8.4(c)]” based
on considerations of “ ‘a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s
role,’” “inconsistent ethical rules in the light of reason,” and “moral
philosophy.”369  Freedman’s first two conclusions—that attorneys
may lie to judges by stating that criminal defendants are innocent370
and may deceive third persons in negotiations371—do not further my
367. See generally Richardson, 712 F.2d at 321 (discussing the valuable contributions
testers make in rooting out discrimination and in defeating false claims).
368. Id.
369. Monroe H. Freedman, In Praise of Overzealous Representation—Lying to Judges,
Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical Conduct, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 771,
781–82 (2006) (quoting MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 14 (2004)).
370. Freedman concluded that criminal defense attorneys may ethically tell a judge
that a client is innocent even if that is a lie, but this conclusion is mostly sup-
ported through an analysis that the judge does not have any right to ask about a
criminal defendant’s innocence. Id. at 773–77.  There can be no doubt that the
attorney could avoid lying altogether simply by ensuring that there absolutely is
no proper role for the court in asking whether a criminal defendant is innocent,
rather than not guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
371. Freedman concluded that attorneys may ethically “deceive” third parties and
judges during negotiations. Id. at 778–80.  This conclusion actually does not sup-
port an endorsement of lying or deceiving in negotiations.  Instead, Freedman
seems to agree with the Model Rules in carving out an area in negotiations where
each party should be on guard against statements that cannot be deemed mate-
rial and/or factual. Id. at 778; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1
cmt. 2 (2007) (discussing “generally accepted conventions” in the course of negoti-
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analysis of attorney deception.  However, it is helpful to discuss Freed-
man’s argument to authorize dishonesty and deception in sting opera-
tions.372  Freedman shares a personal story from the 1960s in which
he helped expose racial discrimination in housing by using testers in
the District of Columbia.373  Freedman relates that the only way to
prove racial discrimination against landlords was by employing test-
ers who would deceptively pose as housing applicants with no interest
in buying or renting, but rather with the sole interest of suing the
landlord for racial discrimination if the landlord appeared to discrimi-
nate based on race.374  Explaining that it was unethical for an attor-
ney to engage in dishonesty, deceit, fraud, or misrepresentation,
Freedman also admitted that he technically violated ethics rules by
acting through the testers.375  Every case where an attorney directs
another person to employ deception necessarily implicates the deriva-
tive ethical duty not to direct someone else to engage in conduct that
the attorney may not ethically perform himself.  Yet, Freedman’s story
demonstrates the importance of authorizing attorneys to direct third
persons to engage in lawful deception to eradicate the harmful societal
effects of intentional, unlawful discrimination.
My express investigation deception exception, contained in Part VI
below, directly condones Freedman’s direction of discrimination test-
ers to use deception.  The State Bar of Arizona also supports this type
of investigation deception exception, albeit as an implied exception.  A
formal opinion concluded that “the use of ‘testers’ who employ some
deceit is proper under the ethical rules to protect society from discrim-
ination based upon disability, race, age, national origin, and gender,”
even in the face of Arizona’s equivalent to Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition on
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.376
Relying on the Isbell–Salvi article, the opinion stated that the decep-
tion prohibition should not act as a shield to hide unlawful discrimina-
tion when the otherwise “legitimate conduct” of using deception is
available to discover the discrimination.377
Undercover criminal informants also play a valuable role in soci-
ety.  Over a half-century ago, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit explained, “Courts have countenanced the use of
informers from time immemorial; . . . it is usually necessary to rely
upon [informers] or upon accomplices because the criminals will al-
most certainly proceed covertly.  Entrapment excluded, . . . decoys and
ations that certain statements should not be taken as statements of material fact,
such as those regarding the value of a transaction or settlement).
372. Freedman, supra note 369, at 780–81.
373. Id. at 780.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. State Bar of Az. Op. 99-11 (1999).
377. Id.
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other deception are always permissible.”378  There has evolved a popu-
lar saying describing the importance of the use of informants to law
enforcement’s investigative efforts: “Good informant, good case.  Bad
informant, bad case.  No informant, no case.”379  It would make little
sense to hinder criminal investigations by applying attorney ethics
rules to inhibit otherwise lawful investigatory conduct.  This belief
was echoed by Justice Burgess of the Supreme Court of Vermont when
he lamented that “the judicial branch, through an ethical rule, might
unconstitutionally interfere with valid, and even statutory, executive
branch functions directed by attorneys supervising undercover dis-
crimination, consumer fraud, and criminal investigations that require
surreptitious taping and deceptive impersonations, including those
authorized by warrant.”380
Notwithstanding the widespread use of informants, testers, and
other investigators, some commentators have fairly criticized the use
of informants as looking “like a game without rules, in which every-
thing is negotiable and no law is sacrosanct.”381  Arguably, the use of
secret undercover informants can engender distrust among the public
for law enforcement activities.382  For example, if the public perceives
the use of secret informants as directed only at the poor, the unedu-
cated, and at drug criminals, while giving a pass to the rich, the edu-
cated, and to most white-collar criminals, then the power behind using
secret informants could do more societal harm than good.383  These
cautionary tales must be addressed to ensure that the authorized use
of deception by attorneys does more good than harm.  However, these
unintended consequences actually speak to execution rather than per-
mission.  A full and open debate should air all of these concerns as to
the proper scope of a deception exception.  As long as attorneys do not
personally employ deception, the larger debate over the use of decep-
378. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 224 (2d Cir. 1950).
379. See ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION
OF AMERICAN JUSTICE 29 (2009) (quoting an “old law enforcement saying”); see
also Statement for the Record, Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security, and Subcomm. on the Constitution,
Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties, 110th Cong. 4 (2007) (statement of Ronald E.
Brooks, President, National Narcotic Officers’ Association Coalition), available at
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/July2007/Brooks070719.pdf (discussing the
necessity of using confidential informants).
380. In re PRB, 989 A.2d 523, 531–32 (Vt. 2009) (Burgess, J., concurring).
381. See, e.g., NATAPOFF, supra note 379, at 45 (describing a system with flexible legal
parameters controlling the government’s use of informants); id. at 67 (contending
that the law surrounding the use of informants is discretionary, laissez-faire,
case-by-case, and mostly unregulated by the judiciary or legislative bodies).
382. See id. at 125–31.
383. See id. at 140 (maintaining that poor and vulnerable suspects are part of an in-
formant system that is less regulated and transparent than that of the white-
collar criminal area).
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tion is generally better left to the democratic process rather than to
the legal profession.
The New York County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Profes-
sional Ethics issued a very narrow opinion that supports the use of
attorney deception in limited circumstances to root out lawlessness.384
Specifically, the opinion concludes that non-government attorneys
may ethically supervise non-attorney investigators using deception
when “the investigation is of a violation of civil rights or intellectual
property rights and the lawyer believes in good faith that such viola-
tion is taking place or will take place imminently,” or the deception is
expressly authorized by law.385  Restricting the situations in which
deception is authorized, the opinion also requires that “the evidence
sought is not reasonably available through other lawful means,” the
conduct of the supervising attorney and the investigator does not vio-
late other provisions of attorney ethics rules or applicable law, the de-
ception does not unlawfully or unethically violate the rights of third
parties, and the investigator does not elicit information protected by
the attorney–client privilege.386  This is an inherently reasonable
opinion.  As such, my proposed investigation deception exception
tracks this opinion’s approach to attorney deception.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York cogently explained why attorney ethics rules should not under-
mine the vital undercover work needed to enforce legal rights:
These ethical rules should not govern situations where a party is legiti-
mately investigating potential unfair business practices by use of an under-
cover [investigator] posing as a member of the general public engaging in
ordinary business transactions with the target.  To prevent this use of investi-
gators might permit targets to freely engage in unfair business practices
which are harmful to both trademark owners and consumers in general.387
The court further explained that enforcing “trademark laws to prevent
consumer confusion is an important policy objective,” to which reliable
reports from “undercover investigators provide an effective enforce-
ment mechanism for detecting and proving anti-competitive activity
which might otherwise escape discovery or proof.”388  This area of pro-
tecting intellectual property rights—which should be no less impor-
tant than enforcing criminal laws or civil anti-discrimination laws—
appears to be ripe for deception, and a consensus is developing which
condones such conduct.  If society deems it beneficial to allow decep-
tion as part of an investigation of whether intellectual property
rights—patents, trademarks or copyrights—are being infringed, then
384. N.Y. County Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. No. 737 (2007),
available at http://www.nycla.org/siteFiles/Publications/Publications519_0.pdf.
385. Id. at 5.
386. Id. at 5–6.
387. Gidatex v. Campaniello Imports, Ltd., 82 F. Supp. 2d 119, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
388. Id. at 124.
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the primary ethical issue becomes whether attorneys may personally
engage in the deception or only direct non-attorneys to use deception.
A leading case that seeks to explain why deception might be re-
quired to uncover unlawful infringement of intellectual property
rights is Apple Corps Ltd. v. International Collectors Society.389  In
Apple Corps, a group of plaintiffs, including Yoko Ono Lennon and the
owners of the rights to the names and likenesses of Paul McCartney
and the legendary rock band the Beatles, sought to enforce a consent
order that precluded the defendant from marketing and selling vari-
ous stamps bearing the images of Yoko Ono or the Beatles.390  While
negotiating licenses with the attorney for the defendant, the plaintiffs’
attorney learned that the defendant was still selling the stamps in
violation of the consent order.391  The plaintiffs’ attorney contacted
the defendant’s attorney, who assured him that the defendant would
cease marketing and selling the stamps.392
Notwithstanding those assurances, the plaintiffs’ attorney decided
to investigate whether the defendant was still selling the stamps in
violation of the consent order.393  The plaintiffs’ attorney called a cus-
tomer-service representative of the defendant and ordered stamps
that were prohibited from being sold under the consent order.394  The
plaintiffs’ attorney admittedly engaged in deception by not divulging
that she was actually an attorney who represented the plaintiff
against the defendant and by misrepresenting that she was simply
purchasing stamps for a John Lennon fan.395  The plaintiffs’ attorney
also instructed others to engage in the same deception to further in-
vestigate whether the defendant was violating the consent order.  The
plaintiffs’ attorney directed her secretary, a stepson of another plain-
tiff’s attorney, an associate attorney for the firm representing one of
the plaintiffs, and five members of a private investigation firm to call
the defendant’s customer-service number to purchase stamps in viola-
tion of the consent order.396  All of these individuals used deception by
not revealing their true identity or real purpose in making the calls
and ordering the stamps.397
Based on the results of the investigation, the plaintiffs’ attorney
sued the defendant to enforce the consent order and hold the defen-
dant in contempt for violating the order.398  The defendants countered
389. 15 F. Supp. 2d 456 (D.N.J. 1998).
390. Id. at 458–60.
391. Id. at 461–62.
392. Id. at 461.
393. Id. at 462.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 462–64 & n.8.
397. Id. at 462–64.
398. Id. at 458–69.
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with accusations that the plaintiffs’ attorney acted unethically by
speaking to the defendant’s employees without the consent of the de-
fendant’s attorney and by deceiving the employees by not revealing
that they were attorneys or people being directed by attorneys.399  The
defendants claimed that the plaintiffs’ attorney violated New Jersey’s
equivalents to the following Model Rules: Rule 4.2’s prohibition of an
attorney from communicating with a person who is represented by an
attorney; Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition of an attorney from engaging in dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; and Rule 4.3’s restriction
on how an attorney may ethically communicate with a person not rep-
resented by an attorney.400
The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey
held that the plaintiffs’ attorney did not violate the ethics rules in con-
ducting her investigation into whether the defendant was violating
the consent order by selling the stamps.401  The court concluded that
there was no violation of Rule 4.2, noting that the “investigators did
not ask any substantive questions other than whether they could or-
der the [prohibited] [s]tamps” and only lied about their “purpose in
calling and their identities” by posing as normal consumers.402  The
court held that Rule 4.2 does not apply when attorneys or “their inves-
tigators, seeking to learn about current corporate misconduct, act as
members of the general public to engage in ordinary business transac-
tions with low-level employees of a represented corporation.”403  The
court also determined that applying Rule 4.2 to prohibit these types of
factual investigations “would serve merely to immunize corporations
from liability for unlawful activity, while not effectuating any of the
purposes behind the rule.”404
The court next held that, although Rule 8.4(c)’s prohibition of dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation applied to attorneys
whether or not they were acting as attorneys, the Rule “does not apply
to misrepresentations solely as to identity or purpose and solely for
evidence-gathering purposes.”405  For support of this implied investi-
gation exception to attorney deception, the court noted that
“[u]ndercover agents in criminal cases and discrimination testers in
civil cases, acting under the direction of lawyers, customarily dissem-
ble as to their identities or purposes to gather evidence of wrongdo-
ing,” and that courts and ethics committees have not condemned as
unethical the “limited use of deception, to learn about ongoing acts of
399. Id. at 472.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 473–76.
402. Id. at 474.
403. Id. at 474–75.
404. Id. at 475.
405. Id. (citing Isbell & Salvi, supra note 236, at 812, 816–18).
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wrongdoing.”406  In a broad stroke, the court proclaimed, “The prevail-
ing understanding in the legal profession is that a public or private
lawyer’s use of an undercover investigator to detect ongoing violations
of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially where it would be dif-
ficult to discover the violations by other means.”407  Analogizing the
attorney’s conduct to the deceptive conduct employed by discrimina-
tion testers, the court claimed that the only way to ensure that the
defendants were complying with the consent order was by calling the
defendant directly to purchase the stamps without the caller’s conceal-
ing her true identity and purpose.408  The court also applied a tor-
tured construction of Rule 8.4(c) by holding that the rule does not
literally mean that attorneys cannot engage in any misrepresenta-
tions, but rather only misrepresentations that involve “grave miscon-
duct” that “raises questions as to a person’s fitness to be a lawyer.”409
The court then openly created an implied investigation exception to fit
its interpretation of Rule 8.4(c):  “Investigators and testers, however,
do not engage in misrepresentations of the grave character implied by
the other words in the phrase [dishonesty, fraud, deceit] but, on the
contrary, do no more than conceal their identity or purpose to the ex-
tent necessary to gather evidence.”410
Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff’s attorney did not
violate Rule 4.3, which prohibits an attorney, while representing a cli-
ent, from implying that the attorney is disinterested when dealing
with an unrepresented person.411  The court concluded that Rule 4.3
only applies to attorneys acting as attorneys, and the purpose behind
the rule was to prevent attorneys from concealing their roles as attor-
neys to take advantage of unrepresented persons.412  Deciding that
the plaintiff’s attorney and her investigators were not acting in their
capacity as attorneys, but were simply engaged in “straightforward
transactions undertaken solely to determine” and investigate whether
the defendant was acting in contempt of the consent order, the court
held that Rule 4.3 did not limit the deceptive conduct of the plaintiff’s
attorney.413
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. See id. at 475–76.
409. Id. (quoting Isbell & Salvi, supra note 236, at 817).
410. Id. at 476 (quoting Isbell & Salvi, supra note 236, at 817) (alterations in original).
411. See id.
412. See id.
413. Id.; see Cartier v. Symbolix, Inc., 386 F. Supp. 2d 354, 362 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing
Apple Corps to announce that the “prevailing understanding in the legal profes-
sion is that a public or private lawyer’s use of an undercover investigator to de-
tect ongoing violations of the law is not ethically proscribed, especially where it
would be difficult to discover the violations by other means”) (internal citation
omitted); see also Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm., Op. RO-2007-05, at 5 (2007)
(adopting the holding of Apple Corps and opining that “in the pre-litigation con-
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Although the soundness of the court’s logic seems inescapable—
that a wrongdoer ordinarily cannot protest when his lawlessness is
discovered—the attorney’s engagement in the deception herself seems
questionable.  A more ethically sound approach would have the attor-
ney direct or supervise a client or investigator undertaking the decep-
tive investigation.  By separating the attorney from the deception, the
legal profession can maintain trust and confidence that attorneys do
not personally manipulate the legal system or evidentiary matters,
but simply take the facts as they come, whether from clients or
investigators.414
In a similar vein, Alabama issued an ethics opinion that concludes
that an attorney does not violate the ethical prohibition against com-
municating with a represented person when the attorney directs an
investigator to misrepresent himself as a customer to see if the plain-
tiff lied about his injuries.415  This implied investigation deception ex-
ception authorizes an attorney to direct someone else to engage in
conduct that the attorney ethically may not do himself.  The founda-
tion of this authorization is that attorney ethics rules should not pro-
hibit a non-attorney from conducting an otherwise lawful
investigation into unlawful activity.  This is the best approach, but
only when crafted as an express investigation deception exception.
D. I’m Not Your Attorney, I’m a Secret Informant: Deception
by Attorneys Acting in a Non-Representational, Non-
Attorney Capacity
At this point in the Article, the issue of attorney deception has
been fully vetted.  You likely have staked a position in the debate
about whether, and to what extent, attorneys should be permitted to
ethically employ deception.  The last issue to be addressed concerns
deception employed by licensed attorneys who do not practice law.
The District of Columbia Bar Legal Ethics Committee demonstrated
that high stakes can be involved in resolving the issue of whether an
attorney may ethically engage in deception when acting in a non-rep-
text a private lawyer may use an undercover investigator to investigate possible
infringement of intellectual property rights posing as customers under the pre-
text of seeking services of the suspected infringers and may misrepresent their
identity and purpose as long as their contact with suspected infringers occur in
the same manner and on the same basis as those of a member of the general
public seeking such services”).
414. This practice would also save the attorney from answering to Rule 3.7’s prohibi-
tion on an attorney acting as both an advocate and a witness at trial.
415. Ala. State Bar Disciplinary Comm., Op. RO-89-31 (1989); see also Will Hill Tank-
ersley & Conrad Anderson IV, Fishing with Dynamite:  How Lawyers Can Avoid
Needless Problems from “Pretextual Calling,” 69 ALA. LAW. 182 (May 2008) (favor-
ing the use of an investigator to avoid issues with Rule 3.7).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 64 15-NOV-10 11:55
282 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:219
resentational capacity.416  The Committee was asked “whether attor-
neys who are employed by a national intelligence agency violate [Rule
8.4(c)] if they engage in fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in the
course of their non-representational official duties.”417  The Commit-
tee answered in the negative but also attempted to narrow the scope of
its implied deception exception for intelligence officials.  The Commit-
tee concluded that so long as an attorney is employed by a government
agency, acts in a non-representational official capacity in the scope of
his employment, and reasonably believes that he is authorized by law
to engage in deception, then Rule 8.4(c)’s deception prohibition does
not apply.418  The Committee reasoned that some federal employees
must use deception to carry out their official duties.  For example, em-
ployees of the Central Intelligence Agency may be required to work in
a clandestine fashion and lie about their identity, employment status,
or even fidelity to the United States.419
As shown above, the issue of whether an attorney may ethically
engage in deception when not acting in a representational capacity
without violating Rule 8.4(c) may be addressed through an implied
investigation deception exception.  The problem with this approach is
that attorneys may be unable to understand the scope of that permis-
sive authority without an express, well-defined investigation decep-
tion exception.  The express investigation deception exception
proposed by this Article alleviates ambiguity and eases the interpreta-
tional burden imposed upon non-representational attorneys seeking to
use deception as part of their official duties.  Because it is reasonable
to authorize a non-attorney to engage in deception during a lawful in-
vestigation to uncover unlawful activity, it should not matter if the
investigator happens to be licensed to practice law.  That is, if the only
limitation on the use of deception lies in the fact that the investigator
happens to have a law license—but does not operate in a representa-
416. D.C. Bar Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 323 (2004).
417. Id. para. 1.
418. Id. para. 16.
419. Id. para. 4.  Other state bar associations have likewise determined that govern-
ment attorneys should not be prohibited from engaging in deception that is other-
wise lawful simply because of the general deception prohibition in the Model
Rules. See, e.g., Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., Op. 02-05, ¶ 2
(2002) (“A governmental lawyer who participates in a lawful covert governmental
operation that entails conduct employing dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation or
deceit for the purpose of gathering relevant information does not, without more,
violate” Rule 8.4); Va. State Bar Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1765, pa-
ras. 2, 7 (2003) (reasoning “that when an attorney employed by the federal gov-
ernment uses lawful methods, such as the use of ‘alias identities’ and non-
consensual tape-recording, as part of his intelligence or covert activities, those
methods” do not violate Rule 8.4(c), which has been amended in Virginia to only
prohibit “conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation which
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law”).
\\server05\productn\N\NEB\89-2\NEB202.txt unknown Seq: 65 15-NOV-10 11:55
2010] TO CATCH A CRIMINAL 283
tional capacity as an attorney—then the logic that would support an
investigation deception exception would apply equally to an attorney
acting in a non-attorney investigative role.  If an attorney’s direction
of an investigator’s lawful use of deception is ethical, then it likewise
should be ethical for the investigator to be an attorney who acts decep-
tively but in a non-representational capacity as a non-attorney.  Once
society determines that deception is needed to catch criminals, stop
unlawful discrimination, or protect intellectual property rights, it
would be unreasonable to exclude attorneys who do not act in a repre-
sentational capacity from the mix of those permitted to use deception.
An attorney not acting in a representational capacity when employing
lawful deception does not undermine the sacred trust placed in attor-
neys to be honest and fair.  If anything, the attorney’s use of deception
would be viewed under the larger issue of whether society generally
condones the use of deception in discovering unlawful activity.
V. SOME STATES ENTER THE DEBATE: EXPRESS
DECEPTION EXCEPTIONS
After embracing a full and open debate on attorney deception, a
few states have enacted express deception exceptions to their ethics
rules.  Alaska added an official comment to its equivalent of Rule 8.4
that creates an express investigation deception exception:
[Rule 8.4] does not prohibit a lawyer from advising and supervising lawful
covert activity in the investigation of violations of criminal law or civil or con-
stitutional rights, provided that the lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in compli-
ance with these rules and that the lawyer in good faith believes there is a
reasonable possibility that a violation of criminal law or civil or constitutional
rights has taken place, is taking place, or will take place in the foreseeable
future.  Though the lawyer may advise and supervise others in the investiga-
tion, the lawyer may not participate directly in the lawful covert activity.
“Covert activity,” as used in this paragraph, means an effort to obtain infor-
mation on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other
subterfuge.420
Under Alaska’s investigation deception exception, both government
and private attorneys may direct investigators to use deception to dis-
cover violations of the civil or criminal law, but  attorneys may not
personally engage in the investigation using deception.  Similarly,
Ohio added an official comment to its version of Rule 8.4 stating that
the prohibition that an attorney not engage in conduct involving dis-
honesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation “does not prohibit a law-
yer from supervising or advising about lawful covert activity in the
investigation of criminal activity or violations of constitutional or civil
420. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 4 (2009).
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rights when authorized by law.”421  Oregon also adopted a similar in-
vestigation deception exception.422
Iowa adopted an investigation deception exception which goes one
step further.  The Iowa exception authorizes an attorney to personally
engage in deception as part of an investigation, in addition to advising
or supervising investigators who employ deception:
It is not professional misconduct for a lawyer to advise clients or others
about or to supervise or participate in lawful covert activity in the investiga-
tion of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights or in lawful
intelligence-gathering activity, provided the lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in
compliance with these rules.  “Covert activity” means an effort to obtain infor-
mation on unlawful activity through the use of misrepresentations or other
subterfuge.  Covert activity may be commenced by a lawyer or involve a law-
yer as an advisor or supervisor only when the lawyer in good faith believes
there is a reasonable possibility that unlawful activity has taken place, is tak-
ing place, or will take place in the foreseeable future.  Likewise, a government
lawyer who supervises or participates in a lawful covert operation which in-
volves misrepresentation or deceit for the purpose of gathering relevant infor-
mation, such as law enforcement investigation of suspected illegal activity or
an intelligence-gathering activity, does not, without more, violate this
rule.423
Florida also enacted an investigation deception exception, but it
only authorizes government attorneys to advise or supervise investi-
421. OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4 cmt. 2A (2007).
422. See OR. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(b) (2009).  The Oregon Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct prohibit attorneys from:
violat[ing] the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist[ing] or
induc[ing] another to do so, or do[ing] so through the acts of another, . . .
commit[ting] a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects, . . . en-
gag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to prac-
tice law, . . . engag[ing] in conduct that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice, . . . [or] mak[ing] a false statement of fact or law to a
tribunal or fail[ing] to correct a false statement of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.
Id. R. 3.3(a)(1), R. 8.4(a)(1)–(4).  That said, however, Oregon attorneys are ethi-
cally permitted to:
advise clients or others about or to supervise lawful covert activity in the
investigation of violations of civil or criminal law or constitutional rights,
provided the lawyer’s conduct is otherwise in compliance with these
Rules of Professional Conduct.  “Covert activity,” as used in this rule,
means an effort to obtain information on unlawful activity through the
use of misrepresentations or other subterfuge.  “Covert activity” may be
commenced by a lawyer or involve a lawyer as an advisor or supervisor
only when the lawyer in good faith believes there is a reasonable possi-
bility that unlawful activity has taken place, is taking place or will take
place in the foreseeable future.
Id. R. 8.4(b).
423. IOWA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 32:8.4 cmt. 6 (2005); see also WIS. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 20:4.1(b) (2010) (stating that notwithstanding Wisconsin’s
equivalents to Rules 5.3(c)(1) and 8.4, an attorney “may advise or supervise
others with respect to lawful investigative activities”).
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gators using deception and non-representational attorneys working
for certain government agencies to engage in deception.424  Specifi-
cally, Florida’s equivalent to Rule 8.4(c) contains the following decep-
tion exception:
[An attorney shall not] engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit,
or misrepresentation, except that it shall not be professional misconduct for a
lawyer for a criminal law enforcement agency or regulatory agency to advise
others about or to supervise another in an undercover investigation, unless
prohibited by law or rule, and it shall not be professional misconduct for a
lawyer employed in a capacity other than as a lawyer by a criminal law en-
forcement agency or regulatory agency to participate in an undercover investi-
gation, unless prohibited by law or rule.425
Along those lines, Alabama carved out a deception exception that
applies only to prosecutors.426  In a specific rule governing the “Spe-
cial Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” Alabama authorizes prosecutors
to direct others to engage in deception that otherwise would violate
424. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4-8.4(c) (2010).
425. Id.  The Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Opinion Committee has concluded that a
“governmental lawyer who participates in a lawful covert governmental opera-
tion that entails conduct employing dishonesty, fraud, misrepresentation or de-
ceit for the purpose of gathering relevant information does not, without more,
violate the Rules of Professional Conduct.”  Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op.
Comm., supra note 419, ¶ 2.  The advisory opinion made clear that it covers the
conduct of all government attorneys so long as the attorney’s dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation “is part of an otherwise lawful government opera-
tion.” Id. ¶¶ 3, 9.  Relying heavily on the article authored by Isbell and Salvi,
supra note 236, the Committee stated that “Rule 8.4(c) was intended to make
subject to professional discipline only illegal conduct by a lawyer that brings into
question the lawyer’s fitness to practice law.  It was not intended to prevent state
or federal prosecutors or other government lawyers from taking part in lawful,
undercover investigations.”  Utah State Bar Ethics Advisory Op. Comm., supra
note 419, ¶¶ 4, 10.  Trying to restrain the scope of its opinion, the Committee
cautioned that it “cannot, however, throw a cloak of approval over all lawyer con-
duct associated with an undercover investigation or ‘covert’ operation,” explain-
ing that “a lawyer’s illegal conduct or conduct that infringes the constitutional
rights of suspects or targets of an investigation might also bring into question the
lawyer’s fitness to practice law.” Id. ¶ 10.  Expanding the problems surrounding
the scope of the implied deception exception for a government attorney, the Com-
mittee also cautioned that there is no “license to ignore the Rules’ other prohibi-
tions on misleading conduct,” such as Rule 4.1(b)’s prohibiting the failure to
disclose material facts to avoid assisting a client in committing criminal or fraud-
ulent acts and Rule 4.3(b)’s prohibiting an attorney from implying that the attor-
ney is disinterested while representing a client and dealing with unrepresented
persons. Id. ¶ 10 & n.20.  Interestingly, and perhaps disappointingly, the Com-
mittee chose to “specifically reserve the issue of whether the analysis and result
of this opinion apply to a private lawyer’s investigative conduct that involves dis-
honesty, fraud, misrepresentation or deceit.” Id. ¶ 10 n.1.  Again, the resolution
of the issue of whether attorneys may ethically engage in deception should be
subject to a full and open debate, rather than a piecemeal approach to the issue
from various bar committees or courts.
426. See ALA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(2)(a) (2008).
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Alabama’s equivalent to the Model Rules.427  In explaining the scope
of this express deception exception, the official comment explains that
there are certain circumstances, such as undercover sting operations,
where the ethical obligations of the prosecutor, as a member of the
legal profession, “might prevent the government from taking action
that would not otherwise be prohibited by any law.”428  The comment
recognizes that in these special circumstances, lying is often essential
to the operation.429  Because attorneys, including prosecutors, are pro-
hibited from lying under their ethics rules and from using others to do
what attorneys cannot do, Alabama sought “to make clear that the
prosecutor may cause the government to act in the fight against crime
to the fullest extent permitted to the government by existing law” such
“that the prosecutor may order, direct, encourage and advise with re-
spect to any lawful governmental action.”430  This includes the use of
deception as part of the law enforcement activity.431  Notwithstanding
a prosecutor’s authority to direct investigators to employ deception to
fight crime, Alabama continues to hold prosecutors personally ac-
countable to the Model Rules’ attorney deception prohibition “to pre-
serve the integrity of the profession of law.”432  Thus, Alabama
recognizes only a narrow exception that applies to prosecutors only—
and not attorneys generally—for the sole purpose of “accommodat[ing]
the prosecutor’s special responsibility in governmental law-enforce-
ment activities.”433
It is certainly admirable that these states have provided express
deception exceptions so that attorneys can reasonably understand if
and when they may ethically employ deception.  Because the debate
on attorney deception does not demand a singular response, however,
variations on the deception exception have naturally evolved.  This is
not a bad development.  It serves to underscore that any attempt to
deploy an ad-hoc, case-by-case interpretive model to an implied decep-
tion exception will meet strong resistance.  Attorneys, and the society
that they serve, deserve to know the scope of permissible ethical
deception.
VI. DRAFTING AN EXPLICIT INVESTIGATION
DECEPTION EXCEPTION
The ABA must amend the Model Rules to expressly address the
issue of attorney deception, regardless of how its membership ulti-
427. Id. R. 3.8(2).
428. Id. cmt.
429. Id.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id.
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mately votes.  Hopefully, the ABA will adopt my express investigation
deception exception.  The problem with creating exceptions to bright-
line prohibitions, however, is that you inherently leave a rock-solid
foundation to find yourself in shifting sands.  Once exceptions are in-
troduced to steadfast prohibitions, the law of unintended conse-
quences will assuredly challenge the scope of the exceptions, but that
is the challenge of all law.  Because a developing consensus believes
that attorney ethics rules should not prohibit non-attorneys from us-
ing deception to conduct lawful investigations, the Model Rules should
be amended to include an express investigation deception exception.
For just over a century, the ABA “has provided leadership in legal
ethics and professional responsibility through the adoption of profes-
sional standards that serve as models of the regulatory law governing
the legal profession.”434  From 1908 to 1964, the ABA began to put in
place a regulatory framework that individual states could adopt to en-
sure that the legal profession, and attorneys within that system,
maintained high ethical standards.435  In 1969, the ABA moved the
ethical ball forward by promulgating the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility, which numerous states then quickly adopted.436  From
1977 to 1983, the ABA again studied attorney ethics rules, resulting
in the ABA’s adoption of the Model Rules.437  Given the existence of
both the Model Code and the Model Rules, states had the option to
adopt either approach—or a combination of the two—to regulate at-
torney conduct.  Over the past two decades, the ABA has adopted a
number of amendments to the Model Rules, reflecting the ongoing de-
bate on how best to ensure ethical conduct within the legal profession
to best serve society.  It is time once again for the ABA to take a lead-
ership role in hammering out the contours of a deception exception.
To that end, I offer the following language to be adopted as an official
comment to Rule 8.4:
Rule 8.4’s restrictions that make it unethical for an attorney to “engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation” or “engage
in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice” are subject to a
permissive investigation deception exception.  This exception permits any at-
torney, whether government or private, and at his or her discretion, to advise,
direct, and supervise a third person, including a client, to use dishonesty, de-
ception, and misrepresentation (particularly as to identity and purpose) while
investigating suspected violations of the criminal or civil law or constitutional
rights so long as (1) the attorney reasonably believes that a violation of the
criminal or civil law or constitutional rights has occurred or is imminent, (2)
the attorney and third person comply with all laws in conducting the investi-
gation, and (3) no other reasonable alternative is available to the attorney to
434. AM. BAR. ASS’N, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT vii (6th ed.
2007).
435. See id.
436. Id.
437. Id.
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discover the suspected violations of the criminal or civil law or constitutional
rights.  An attorney who is not acting in a representational capacity (e.g., an
attorney employed as an investigator for a government agency) is permitted to
personally use dishonesty, deception, and misrepresentation as outlined
above.  An attorney acting in a representational capacity has no authority to
personally use dishonesty, deception, and misrepresentation.  The purpose be-
hind this investigation deception exception is to promote the discovery of un-
lawful activity that otherwise often goes undetected.  For example, criminal
investigators may need to use deception when conducting undercover sting
operations; civil rights activists may need to use deception to uncover unlaw-
ful discrimination in employment, housing, education, lending, public accom-
modations, and government services; and holders of intellectual property
rights may need to use deception to discover violations of those rights.  This
investigation deception exception in no way authorizes an attorney to violate
any other ethical rule.  An attorney who seeks to employ deception is cau-
tioned to review Rules 1.2(d), 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 4.4, 5.1, 5.2, 5.3,
and 7.1.
An obvious criticism of an ethics rule that authorizes attorneys to
direct others to use deception while attorneys themselves cannot per-
sonally engage in the deception is that this seems to end in a logical
loop.  Why is it ethical for non-attorneys to engage in deception while
it is unethical for attorneys to engage in deception?  As maintained
throughout this Article, the answer lies in the unique position that
attorneys occupy in our democratic society.  To ensure that society has
faith in the justice system and the rule of law, it is important for the
legal profession to strive to engender complete trust that attorneys act
ethically by being diligent, competent, loyal, fair, and honest.  Encour-
aging or enabling attorneys to lie and deceive—particularly when
those lies and deceptions would benefit the attorney and her client—
has the real potential to strike a blow to the foundation of trust that
the legal profession strives to maintain in society.  Additionally, attor-
neys do not create the conflict and generate the cases in our system.
Rather, attorneys simply take on the interests of their clients, because
each case belongs to the client before it belongs to the attorney.  More-
over, the facts are the facts.  Attorneys should not set out to make the
facts of a case or preemptively create a case out of whole cloth.
Society will function just fine if attorneys do not personally engage
in deception, even if society would benefit from its use.  There are
plenty of other interested and capable persons who can lawfully en-
gage in deception that will inure to the benefit of society without au-
thorizing attorneys to be perceived as self-interested liars.  If society
determines that it should be lawful—or unlawful for that matter—to
employ deception to catch criminals, root out unlawful discrimination,
or protect intellectual property rights, for instance, then citizens can
respond through their elected representatives.  This democratic ap-
proach to the issue far surpasses forcing attorneys to bear the societal
burden of the usefulness of deception.  It also maintains the integrity
of the legal profession.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Currently the Model Rules do not contain a deception exception—
express or implied—that would authorize attorneys to utilize decep-
tion as part of an investigation into unlawful activity.  Although attor-
neys should be held to the highest ethical standards and should never
claim that lying is an admirable trait, society benefits through the
limited and controlled use of lawful deception.  Governments routinely
use deception in undercover investigations to catch criminals, civil
rights activists employ deception to help eradicate unlawful discrimi-
nation, and owners of intellectual property rights utilize deception to
determine whether others unlawfully infringe upon those rights.  If
society has not outlawed the use of deception in those circumstances,
then a set of ethics rules governing attorney behavior should not tamp
down the ability of others to lawfully engage in deception for limited
but equally important purposes.  Likewise, there is no sound public
policy that would require attorneys to personally engage in the decep-
tion.  There is no reason to suppose that attorneys should individually
bear the societal responsibility to investigate and discover unlawful
activity.  As long as attorneys are not precluded from directing or su-
pervising third persons’ use of deception as part of lawful investiga-
tions into unlawful activity, then attorneys should still be held to the
high standard of ethical conduct that requires honesty by not being
allowed to personally engage in deception.
In the final analysis, all law—and ethics rules are no exception—
emanates from society’s collective experience to resolve conflict.  In a
phrase, law is public policy that best serves a democratic society.  To
balance society’s need to vigorously investigate unlawful activity by
all lawful means with ensuring that attorneys are perceived to have
unbending ethics and unyielding honesty in maintaining the system of
justice and the rule of law, I propose that the ABA amend the Model
Rules to include an express investigation deception exception.  This
exception would authorize attorneys to direct third persons to use de-
ception in lawful investigations while preserving an attorney’s obliga-
tion to act honestly and free from deception.  This strikes a balance
that serves our democratic society while protecting the sacred institu-
tion of our system of justice, in which faith in the honesty and integ-
rity of attorneys plays an integral role.
